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THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE
VOLUME THE FIRST

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ARISTOTLE

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ARISTOTLE

BOOK I

CHAPTER I



VERY art, and every system, and in like manner every action and purpose aims, it is thought, at some good; for which reason a common and by no means a bad description of the good is, 'that at which all things aim.'

But it is clear there is a difference in the ends proposed: for in some cases they are activities, and in others results beyond the mere activities, and where there are certain ends beyond and beside the actions, the results are naturally superior to the activities. Now, as there are numerous kinds of actions and numerous arts and sciences, it follows that the ends are also various. Thus the end

of the healing art is health, of ship-building ships, of strategy victory, of economy wealth.

But when a number of them fall under some one art or science, as the art of making bridles, and all such other arts as make the instruments of horsemanship, under horsemanship, and this again, together with every action connected with war, under strategy, and in the same way other arts or sciences under others; in all these cases the end of the master-art is more desirable than the ends of the subordinate arts or sciences, as it is for the sake of the former that the latter are themselves sought after.

And this is equally true whether the activities are themselves the ends of the actions, or something else beyond the activities, as is the case in the arts and sciences just mentioned.

If, then, in the sphere of action there is some one end which we desire for its own sake, and for the sake of which we desire every thing else; and if we do not choose every thing for the sake of something else, for this would go on without limit, and our

desire would be idle and futile, it is clear that this must be the supreme good, and the best thing of all.

And surely to know what this good is, is of great importance for the conduct of life, for in that case we shall be like archers shooting at a definite mark, and shall be more likely to do what is right. But, if this is the case, we must try to comprehend, in outline at least, what it is and to which of the sciences it belongs.

Now one would naturally suppose it to belong to the science or faculty which is most commanding and most inclusive, and to this description the science of politics plainly answers; for it determines what sciences are necessary in a state, and which of them individuals are to learn, and what degree of proficiency is to be required. Moreover, we see that the most highly esteemed faculties, such as strategy, domestic economy, and rhetoric, are subordinate to it. And since this science makes use of all the other practical sciences, and furthermore lays down rules as to what men are to do, and what to abstain from doing,

it follows that its end will comprehend the ends of all the other sciences, and will be, in fact, the good of man. For though the good of an individual is identical with the good of a state, yet the good of the state is a grander and more perfect thing to obtain and preserve; for though we may often be contented with merely individual good, yet the good of a nation or state is nobler and more divine.

These then are the objects proposed by our treatise, which is of a political nature: and I conceive I shall have spoken on them satisfactorily, if they be made as distinctly clear as the subject-matter admits, for the same exactness must not be looked for in all kinds of reasoning any more than in all kinds of manufacture. Things noble and things just, with the investigation of which the science of politics is concerned, admit of so much difference and uncertainty, that they are supposed by some to have only a conventional, and not a natural existence. There is a similar uncertainty in regard to things which are good in themselves, because of the harm they some-

times do. For before now some men have been ruined by wealth, and others by courage.

We must be content then, in reasoning upon these subjects, to set forth the truth roughly and in outline; and when our premises are not universal laws but statements of what generally or probably occurs, to draw only probable conclusions. And in the same spirit should each person accept all that is here stated: for the man of education will expect accuracy in each subject only so far as the nature of the subject admits, it being plainly much the same absurdity to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician, as to require demonstrative proofs from a rhetorician.

But each man judges well the things which he knows, and of these he is a good judge: on each particular subject then, he is a good judge who has been instructed in that subject, and in a general way the man of general mental cultivation.

Hence it is that young men are not fitting students of moral philosophy, for they have no experience in the actions of life which

form the premises and subjects of the reasonings; and in the next place, since they are apt to follow the impulses of their passions, they will hear as though they heard not, and to no profit, the end in view being conduct and not merely knowledge.

And this applies to those who are young in character as well as in years. For the defect to which I allude is not a matter of time, but is due to living at the beck and call of passion, and following the objects which passion suggests. In the case of such persons, as in the case of the intemperate man, knowledge is of no avail: but to those whose desires and actions are guided by reason, the knowledge of these subjects must be very profitable.

Let thus much suffice by way of preface, as to the student of political science, the spirit in which it should be studied, and the object which we set before ourselves.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FIRST CHAPTER

CHAPTER II



UT returning to our argument, since all knowledge and moral purpose aims at some good, what is the good which we say the political science has in view? or, in other words, what is the highest of all the goods attainable by action?

Now, as far as the name goes, there is a pretty general agreement: for both the educated and the uneducated call it happiness, and 'living well' and 'doing well' they conceive to be synonymous with 'being happy'; but as to the nature of this happiness, they disagree, and the multitude do not in their account of it agree with the wise. The mass of mankind define it as something palpable and apparent, as pleasure or wealth or honour; some one and some another; nay, oftentimes the same man gives a different definition of it at different times; for if he is ill, he thinks

happiness is health ; if he is poor, he thinks it is wealth : and if he is conscious of his own ignorance, he thinks happiness is knowledge, and so admires those who talk grandly and above his comprehension. Some philosophers, again, have thought that beside these many good things, there is some absolute good which is the cause of their goodness.

To examine all these opinions, would be perhaps rather a fruitless task ; so it will be sufficient to examine those which are most generally current, or which appear to have some reason in them.

But we must not forget the difference between discussions which proceed from first principles, and discussions which go back to first principles. For Plato was right in raising the question whether the right method was from principles or to principles, just as in the race-course from the judges to the goal, or vice-versâ.

We must begin, of course, with such facts as are known ; but facts may be known in two ways ; one, relatively to ourselves, the other, absolutely.

Perhaps then we must begin with such facts as are known to us from individual experience. It is necessary therefore that the person who is to study, with any tolerable chance of profit, the principles of nobleness and justice and politics generally, should have received a good moral training. For our data here are moral judgments, and if a man knows what it is right to do, he does not require a formal reason. And a person that has been thus trained, either possesses these first principles already, or can easily acquire them. As for him who neither possesses nor can acquire them, let him take to heart the words of Hesiod : ‘ He is the best of all who thinks for himself in all things. He, too, is good who takes advice from a wiser. But he who neither thinks for himself, nor lays to heart another’s wisdom, this is a useless man.’

THIS IS THE END OF THE
SECOND CHAPTER

CHAPTER III



UT to return from this digression.

Now men seem, not unreasonably, to form their notions of the supreme good and of happiness from the lives of men. The majority of mankind and people who lack refinement conceive it to be pleasure, and hence they approve a life of sensual enjoyment. For there are three lines of life which stand out prominently to view: the life of pleasure, the political life, and the life of reflection.

Now the mass of mankind are plainly quite slavish in their character, choosing a life like that of brute animals: yet they obtain some consideration, because many of the great share the tastes of Sardanapalus. The refined and active, on the other hand, prefer honour, which I suppose may be said to be the end of the political life. Yet honour is plainly too superficial to be the object of our search, because

it appears to depend rather on those who give than on those who receive it, whereas we feel instinctively that the good must be something proper to a man, which cannot easily be taken from him.

Besides, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may believe themselves to be good. Accordingly, they seek to be honoured by the wise, and by those who know them well, and on the score of virtue; it is clear, therefore, that in their opinion at any rate, virtue is superior to honour. Perhaps, then, one ought to say that virtue rather than honour is the end of the political life; yet even virtue is plainly too imperfect: for it seems that a man might have all the virtues and yet be asleep, or fail to achieve anything all his life; moreover, such a person may suffer the greatest evils and misfortunes. And no one, in this case, would call a man, who passed his life in this manner, happy, except for argument's sake. But it is unnecessary to dwell further on this subject, for it has been sufficiently discussed in my *Encyclia*.

The third kind of life is the life of con-

templation, concerning which we shall make our examination later on.

As for the life of money-making, it is one of constraint, and wealth is manifestly not the good of which we are in search, for it is only useful as a means to something else, and for this reason there is less to be said for it than for the ends mentioned before, which are, at any rate, desired for their own sakes. Yet, clearly, they are not the objects of our search either, though many arguments have been expended upon them. Let these things, therefore, be dismissed.

But it is better perhaps to examine next the universal good, and to enquire in what sense the expression is used. Though such an investigation is likely to be difficult, because the persons who have introduced these ideas are our friends. Yet it will perhaps appear the best, and indeed the right course, at least for the preservation of truth, to do away with private feelings, especially as we are philosophers; for since both are dear to us, we are bound to prefer the truth. Now the persons who invented this doctrine of ideas

did not apply a common idea to those things in which they spoke of priority and posteriority, and so they never made any common idea of numbers. But good is predicated in the categories of substance, quality, and relation; now that which exists of itself, that is, substance, is, in the nature of things, prior to that which is relative, because this latter is, as it were, an offshoot and result of that which is; on their own principle then there cannot be an idea which is common to them both.

In the next place, there are as many ways of predicating good as there are modes of existence; for it is predicated of substance, as God or the mind, of quality, as the virtues, of quantity, as the mean, of relation, as utility, of time, as opportunity, and of place, as home; and so on. Manifestly, therefore, it cannot be a common universal idea or a unity: else it would not have been predicated in all the categories, but only in one.

And further, since of those things which fall under one idea there is one science also, there would be some one science of all good things: but in fact there are many

sciences even of such good things as fall under one category: for instance, the science of opportunity (which I have before mentioned as being in the category of time,) in war, is strategy; in disease, medicine; and the science of the mean (which I quoted before as being in the category of quantity,) in food, is medicine; and in exercise, the science of gymnastics. A person might fairly doubt also what in the world they mean by the 'absolute' this that or the other, since, as they would themselves allow, the account of the humanity is one and the same in the absolute man, and in any individual man: for so far as the individual and the absolute man are both man, they will not differ at all: and if so, then the essential good and any particular good will not differ, in so far as both are good. Nor will it do to say, that the eternity of the absolute good makes it to be more good; for a white thing which has lasted white ever so long, is no whiter than that which only lasts for a day.

But the Pythagoreans do seem to give a more credible account of the matter, who

introduce unity into their catalogue of goods: and, in fact, Speusippus seems to agree with them.

But of these questions let us speak at some other time. There is, however, plainly some small room to object to my arguments, on the plea that the doctrine of ideas was not meant to apply to all goods; but those goods only, which are pursued and desired simply for their own sakes, are spoken of as being under one idea, whereas those things which tend to produce or in any way preserve them, or to hinder their contraries, are called good because of these circumstances, and in another sense. It is clear then that there will be two kinds of goods. Some being things good on their own account and others good on account of these.

Very well then, let us separate the absolute goods from the useful, and consider whether they can be said to come under one idea. But the question next arises, what kind of things are we to call absolute? Would they be all such as are sought after independently of their consequences, as, for in-

stance, wisdom, sight, and certain pleasures and honours? For though we do seek after these with some further end in view, still we may place them among the absolute goods. Or does it come in fact to this, that we can call nothing absolutely good except the idea, so that the system of ideas will be absurd?

But if, on the other hand, there are absolute goods, then we shall require that the same definition of goodness should distinctly appear in all of them, just as the same definition of whiteness in snow and white lead. But the definitions of honour, wisdom and pleasure are distinct and different in respect of goodness. The good then is not one common thing falling under one idea.

But how, then, does the word good come to be so applied? For it does not appear to be an accidental homonymy. Is it that all goods arise from one source or converge to one end; or is it not rather a case of analogy? for as the sight is to the body so is the mind to the soul, and so on. However, we ought perhaps to leave these questions for the present, for an accurate

investigation of them would more properly belong to another branch of philosophy. But the same is true respecting the idea: for even if there is some one good which is predicated of all things that are good, or some abstract and absolute good, manifestly it cannot be the object of human action or attainable by man; and therefore will not be such a good as we are now in search of.

But perhaps it may occur to some person, that it would be better to have a thorough knowledge of this universal good as having a relation to those goods which are attainable and practical, because, with this as a kind of model in our hands, we shall the better know what things are good for us individually, and when we know them, we shall be able to acquire them.

Some plausibility, it is true, this argument possesses, but it seems to be inconsistent with scientific experience; for while all sciences aim at some particular good, and seek to fill up the deficiency, yet they omit to study this good. Now it is not reasonable to suppose that all artisans without excep-

tion should be ignorant of a thing of so great a help to them as this would be, and should not even search for it. Neither is it easy to see what benefit a weaver or carpenter will get in respect of his craft by knowing the absolute good, or how a man will be made a better doctor or a better general for having studied the absolute idea. For manifestly it is not health after this general and abstract fashion which is the subject of the physician's investigation, but the health of man, or rather perhaps of a particular man; for he has to heal individuals. Thus much on these points.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
THIRD CHAPTER

CHAPTER IV



now let us revert to the good of which we are in search, and consider what it can be. For manifestly it is different in different actions or arts: for it is one thing in medicine, another in strategy, and likewise in the other sciences. What then is the good in each? Is it not 'that for the sake of which the other things are done?' and this in medicine is health, in strategy victory; in house-building, a house, and so on. In short, in every action and purpose it is the end, because it is for the sake of the end that all men do everything else. So that if there is some one end of all our actions, this end will be the practicable good, and if several such ends, then these.

Thus our argument after some traversing about has come to the same conclusion as before. But we must try to make this clearer.

Now seeing that there are many ends, and of these we choose some of them merely as means, for instance, wealth, flutes, and instruments generally; it is clear that all ends are not final, but the supreme good is manifestly something final; and so, if there is some one final end, this will be the object of our search; if more than one, it will be the most final of them.

But we call that which is desired for its own sake more final than that which is desired as a means to something else, and that which is never chosen as a means as more final than that which is chosen both as an end and as a means: and so by the term 'absolutely final.' we denote that which is always chosen as an end in itself, and never as a means to something else.

Now happiness appears to be pre-eminently of this character, for we always choose it for its own sake, and never for the sake of anything else: whereas honour and pleasure and intellect, in fact every excellent quality we choose, partly, it is true, for their own sakes, for we should choose each of

these even if no result were to follow, but partly also for the sake of happiness, conceiving that by their means we shall be happy. But no one chooses happiness for the sake of these things, nor for the sake of anything else at all.

And we reach the same result if we start from the consideration of self-sufficiency, for the final good must be self-sufficient. But by self-sufficient, we do not mean for a man living a solitary life, but for his parents also and children and wife, and, in short, friends and fellow-citizens; for man is by nature a social being. It is true that we must draw the line somewhere, for if one includes parents and descendants and friends' friends, there will be no end to it. This point must, however, be left for future investigation: for the present we define the self-sufficient as that which of itself makes life desirable and in need of nothing, and this is, we think, pre-eminently the characteristic of happiness. And further, we conceive happiness to be itself the most desirable of all things, but in calling it the most desirable of all things,

we do not mean to imply that it is merely one among others. If it were one among other good things, the addition of even the least good would render it more desirable, since addition increases the amount, and the greater of two goods is always the more desirable.

Happiness, then, is manifestly something final and self-sufficient, being the end of all action.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FOURTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER V



UT, it may perhaps be said that everyone is agreed that happiness is the supreme good; and what is wanted is some clearer definition of its real nature. Now this object may be easily attained, when we have ascertained what is the proper function of man. For just as goodness and excellence in a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artisan, or generally in anybody who has any definite work or course of action, seems to lie in the performance of his work, so it would appear to be with man, if so be, he has a definite function.

But if a carpenter and a cobbler have definite functions and courses of action, we cannot suppose that man as man has none, but is left by nature without one. Surely if the eye, the hand, the foot, and generally each part of the body, has manifestly some special function; so too man, as distinct from

all these, has some definite function of his own.

What then can this function be? It cannot be mere life, because that plainly is shared with him even by plants, and we are looking for something that is peculiar to him. We must therefore set aside the life of mere nourishment and growth. Next comes the life of sensation, but this again is manifestly common to horses, cattle, and every kind of animal. There remains then only the life of a being possessed of reason and exercising it. This life, too, may be conceived of in two senses, either as working or quiescent, but we must take that which is in the way of actual working, because this seems to be its more correct sense. The function of man, then, is an activity of the soul in accordance with reason, or not independently of reason. But the function of a man of a certain profession, and the function of a man who is good at that profession, as, for instance, of a harp-player and a good harp-player, are generically the same. And this is true of people of all kinds, the superior excellence being only

an addition to the function; for it is the function of a harp-player to play the harp, and of a good harp-player to play it well. This being so, if we define the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this life as an activity of the soul in accordance with reason, and if the function of a good man is to do these things well and nobly, and if everything is performed well when it is performed in accordance with its proper excellence: then the good of man comes to be an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, or, if virtue admits of degrees, in accordance with the best and most perfect virtue. To which we must add, in a full and complete term of life; for as one swallow or one fine day does not make spring, so one day or a short time of happiness does not make a man blessed and happy.

Let this then be taken for a rough sketch of the supreme good: since it is probably the right way to draw the outline first, and to fill in the details afterwards. It would seem that anybody may complete in detail what has been satisfactorily sketched in outline, and that

time is a good assistant in discovering such matters. It is thus, in fact, that all improvements in the various arts have been brought about, as anybody can supply a deficiency.

But we must bear in mind what has been already stated, and not look for the same degree of exactness in all departments of inquiry alike, but in each according to the subject-matter, and so far as properly belongs to that particular branch of knowledge. The carpenter and the geometrician, for instance, both have to do with the right angle, but in different ways: the one so far as he wants it for his work, the other being concerned with truth enquires into its nature and properties.

This same method should be pursued in other cases also, so that the subordinate matters may not become of greater importance than the main ones.

Again, we must not demand the reason why in all cases alike, because in some cases it is sufficient that the fact has been well demonstrated, as in the case of first principles; for the fact itself constitutes a starting-point and first principle.

And of these first principles, some are discovered by induction, some by perception, some by habituation, others in other ways. We must try to trace up each in their own nature, and take pains to define them satisfactorily, because they have great influence on what follows from them : it is thought, I mean, that the starting-point or principle is more than half the whole matter, and that many of the objects of our enquiry become clear through it.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FIFTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VI



WE must now enquire concerning happiness, not only from our conclusion and the data on which our reasoning proceeds, but likewise from the opinions that are commonly held on the subject. For if a thing be true, all common facts will readily harmonise, but the truth is very soon found to clash with that which is false.

There is a common division of goods into three classes; external goods as they are called, goods of the soul, and goods of the body. And of these, the last, we consider to be goods in the strictest and best sense. Well, in our definition we assume that the activities of the soul constitute happiness, and these of course belong to the soul. And so our definition is a good one, at least according to this opinion which is of ancient date, and approved by philosophers. Rightly too are cer-

tain actions and activities said to be the end, for thus it appears that the end is some good of the soul and not an external good. The popular notion, that the happy man lives well and fares well, also agrees with our definition, for it has been stated by us that happiness is a kind of living well and doing well.

Further, the various things that people look for in happiness will be found to be contained in this definition.

For some people think that happiness is virtue, others wisdom and prudence, others a kind of philosophy; others that it is these, or some one of them, in combination with or not dissociated from pleasure; while others again include outward prosperity.

Some of these opinions rest on the authority of numbers or antiquity, others on that of few, and those men of repute: and it is not likely that either of these classes is altogether wrong, but that in some one point, if not in most, both the multitude and the philosophers are right.

Now, with those who assert it to be virtue or excellence of some sort, our definition

agrees: for activity in accordance with virtue implies virtue.

But there is perhaps a considerable difference between conceiving of the supreme good as in possession or as in use, in other words, as a mere habit or as an activity. For the habit may possibly exist in a subject without effecting any good result, as, for instance, in him who is asleep, or in any other way inactive; but this is impossible in the case of an activity, for it will of necessity act, and act well. And as at the Olympic games it is just the finest and strongest, not of those who are present, but of those who contest the prize, that are crowned, for of these some conquer; so too in life, it is those who not only have the virtues, but who manifest them, who rightly win the prizes.

Their life too is pleasant in itself: for the feeling of pleasure is a mental sensation, and that which a man is said to be fond of is pleasant to him: a horse, for instance, to him who is fond of horses, and a sight to him who is fond of sights: and so in like manner just actions to the lover of justice, and, in a word, virtuous actions to the lover of virtue. Now

in the case of the multitude, the things which they individually esteem pleasant clash, because they are not naturally pleasant, whereas to the lovers of nobleness natural things are pleasant: but the actions done in accordance with virtue are of this kind, so that they are pleasant both relatively to these persons and also in themselves.

So then their life has no need of the addition of pleasure as a kind of appendage, but possesses pleasure in itself. For, besides what has been said, a man is not good if he takes no pleasure in noble actions, just as no person would call that man just, who takes no pleasure in acting justly; or liberal, who takes no pleasure in liberal actions, and similarly with the other virtues. If this be so, it follows that the actions done in accordance with virtue must be pleasant in themselves. But they are also good and noble, and that in the highest degree: if we are to trust the judgment of the good man, for he judges as we have said.

Happiness then is the best, the loveliest, and the pleasantest thing in the world, and these qualities are not divided as in the Delian inscription: 'Noblest is that which is

most just, and best is health; and pleasantest is the obtaining one's desires.' For all these are qualities of the best activities: and we say that happiness is these, or the best one of them.

Still it is clear that happiness does require the addition of external goods, as we have said; because, without external means, it is impossible, or at any rate difficult, to do noble actions. For there are many things that can be done only through the instrumentality of friends, money, and political influence, and there are some things the lack of which mars happiness, as, for instance, noble birth, good children, or personal beauty. For a person is incapable of happiness if he is very ugly, or is base-born, or solitary and childless: and still more so, perhaps, if he has very bad children or friends, or has lost good ones by death. As we have said, then, the addition of prosperity of this kind does seem necessary to complete the idea of happiness; hence some people identify good fortune, and others virtue, with happiness.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
SIXTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VII



THIS opens up the question whether happiness is a thing that can be learned, or acquired by habit or discipline of any other kind, or whether it comes by divine dispensation, or even by chance.

Now, if anything in the world is a gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is such a gift, inasmuch as it is the best of all human possessions. But this, it may be, is a question belonging more properly to another branch of study: and it is quite clear, that even if happiness is not sent from the gods direct, but comes to us as the result of virtue and learning and discipline of some kind, it is yet one of the most divine things; because the prize and end of virtue is manifestly something blessed and divine.

It will also be widely participated, for it may, by study and diligent application, exist

in every person who is not disqualified by some moral deformity.

And if it is better that happiness should be attained by these means than as a result of chance, it is reasonable to suppose that it is so produced, since natural productions are produced in the best possible way; and likewise the productions of art, and of every principle of causation, especially the highest. To leave then to chance, what is greatest and noblest would be altogether inconsistent.

The question may be determined also by a reference to our definition of happiness, which was, that it is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue of a certain kind: and of the other goods, some are necessary as conditions of happiness, and others are by their nature useful as aids and instruments of happiness.

These conclusions will harmonise also with what we said at the outset: for we laid it down that the end of the science of politics is most excellent: for it devotes the principal part of its care to form the characters of the citizens, or in other words, to make them good, and ready for noble actions.

With good reason then we refuse to call an ox or horse or any other animal happy, for none of them is able to participate in such an activity: and for this same reason a child cannot be called happy, because by reason of his tender age he cannot yet display this activity: if we call a child happy, it is in the hope that he may live to be so.

For to constitute happiness, there must be, as we have said, perfect virtue and a complete term of life. For there are changes and chances of all kinds in life, and he who is most prosperous may, in his old age, become involved in great misfortunes, as, in the heroic poems, is told of Priam. But no one calls a man happy, who has experienced such chances and died in wretchedness.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
SEVENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VIII



ARE we then to call no man happy while he is alive, and, as Solon would have us, look to the end? And again, if we are to maintain this position, is a man then happy when he is dead? or is this wholly absurd, especially in us who define happiness as a certain kind of activity?

But if we do not call one who is dead happy, and if Solon does not mean this, but that only then can one safely call a man happy, as being beyond the reach of evils and misfortunes, even this view admits of some dispute, since it is thought that one who is dead is capable of being affected both by good and evil, as a man may be when alive but unconscious, that is by honours and dishonours, and by the good and bad fortune of his children and descendants generally.

Nor is this view without its difficulties: for

after a man has lived in happiness to old age and died accordingly, many changes may befall him in the persons of his descendants. Some of them may be good and obtain positions in life in accordance with their merits, others again quite the contrary. It is plain, too, that descendants may stand in all manner of relations to their ancestors. It would be indeed absurd, if the dead man were to participate in their changes and become at one time happy and at another miserable. And it would also be absurd, that the affairs of descendants should not affect their ancestors in any instance, or at any time.

But we must revert to the point first raised, since the present question may perhaps be easily determined from that.

If then we are to look to the end, and when the end comes to call a man happy, not because he is, but because he has been happy at some previous time, surely it is absurd that at the time when he is happy we should refuse to say it of him, because we are unwilling to pronounce the living happy by reason of their liability to changes, and because we have con-

ceived of happiness as something stable and by no means admitting of change, whereas good and bad fortune are constantly circling about the same people. It is quite clear, that if we follow the changes of fortune, we shall often have to call the same man at one time happy and at another miserable, thus representing the happy man as a kind of chameleon set upon an insecure foundation. Is not this the solution? that to make our sentence dependent on the changes of fortune, is altogether wrong. For it is not upon these that goodness or evil depends, though human life needs these as accessories, as we have said already, but a man's activities in accordance with virtue are what constitute his happiness, and the opposite activities constitute his misery.

And, by the way, the question which has been now discussed testifies incidentally to the truth of our definition of happiness. For no work of man's hands is so stable as are the activities in accordance with virtue, for they seem to be more abiding even than the sciences. Moreover, of these it is the most

honourable which are the most abiding, for it is in these that the life of the happy chiefly, and most continuously, consists, which seems to be the reason why they are not forgotten. So then this stability which is sought will be found in the happy man, and he will be such through life, for constantly, or as constantly as possible, he will be doing and contemplating the things which are in accordance with virtue; and the various chances of life he will bear most nobly, and at all times and in all ways acting up to the character of a truly good man, four-square without a flaw.

But since the events of chance are many, and differ in greatness and smallness, the small incidents of good or ill fortune evidently do not affect the balance of life, but such incidents as are great and numerous, if they are good, will make life happier, for they naturally tend to give grace to life, and the use of them is noble and virtuous; but, if they are evil, they mar and deface happiness, for they bring pain with them, and hinder many activities. Still, even in these, a man's nobility shines out when a man bears contentedly many and

great misfortunes, not from insensibility to pain, but because he is noble and high-spirited.

And if, as we have said, a man's activities are what determine the character of his life, no one who is truly happy can ever become miserable, for he will never do what is hateful and mean. For we hold that the man who is truly good and sensible bears every accident of fortune becomingly, and always does what is noblest under the circumstances, just as a good general employs to the best advantage the force he has at his disposal; or a good shoemaker makes the best shoe he can out of the leather supplied to him; and so on with all the other arts. And if this be so, the happy man can never become miserable, though we cannot call him blessed, if he fall into misfortunes like those of Priam.

Nor, in truth, will he be variable and liable to change, for on the one hand, he will not be shaken easily from his happiness nor by ordinary misfortunes, but, if at all, only by those which are great and numerous; and, on the other, after such misfortunes he will not

regain his happiness in a little time; but, if he regains it at all, it will be only after a long and complete period, during which he has made himself master of great and noble things.

Why then should we not call that man happy whose activity accords with perfect virtue, and who is adequately furnished with external goods, not for any chance period, but for a full and complete term of life.

Or must we add, that not only is he to live so, but that his death must be in keeping with his life, since the future is dark to us, and happiness we take to be an end and in every way final and complete. And, if this be so, we shall call people happy during their lifetime who have and will have these characteristics, but happy only so far as men may be happy.

Let it suffice to have defined thus much on these points.

CHAPTER IX



NOW, the idea that the condition of the dead is in no way affected by the fortunes of their descendants, and of their friends generally, is plainly a very heartless notion, and contrary to current opinion.

But since the effects of fortune are numerous, and differ in all kinds of ways, and some come home to us much more than others, it would evidently be a long and endless task to discuss them individually: and so it must suffice to describe them generally and in outline.

If then, as of the misfortunes which happen to one's self, some have a certain weight, and influence our life, while others are, so to speak, comparatively light: so it is likewise with those which befall our friends generally. But it makes much more difference whether each misfortune happens to living or dead persons, than whether the various horrors in a tragedy

are actually perpetrated or merely supposed to have already happened. We must therefore take account of this difference also; and still more perhaps of the doubt concerning the dead, whether they really partake of any good or evil; it seems to result from all these considerations, that if anything, whether good or evil, does pierce the veil and reach them, it must be something trivial and small, either in itself or in relation to them; or at least of such a magnitude as to be incapable of making happy those that are not so already, or of depriving of their happiness those that are.

It is plain then that the good or evil fortunes of friends do affect the dead to some extent: but in such manner and to such extent as neither to make happy those that are not so already, nor to produce any similar effect.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
NINTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER X



HAVING determined these points, let us consider whether happiness belongs to the class of things praiseworthy or of things honourable; for it evidently is not a mere potential good.

Now it is plain that everything which is a subject of praise is praised because it is of a certain character, and has a certain relation to something: for instance, the just, and brave, and good man generally, and virtue itself, we praise, because of their actions and the results: and the strong man, and the quick runner, and so on, we praise because he is naturally of a certain character, and has a certain relation to something that is good and excellent. But this is clear from the praises given to the gods, for such praise appears ridiculous when referred to us, and this results from the fact, that all praise does, as we have said, imply

reference to a higher standard. Now if it is to such objects that praise belongs, it is evident that what is applicable to the best objects is not praise, but something greater and better: which is indeed the case, for not only do we call the gods blessed and happy, but we also pronounce those men blessed who most nearly resemble the gods. The same thing is true of goods; for no man thinks of praising happiness as he praises justice, but he calls it blessed, as being something more divine and more excellent.

Eudoxus too is thought to have advanced a sound argument in urging the claim of pleasure to the highest place: for the fact of its not being praised, though a good, he took as an indication of its superiority to those things which are subjects of praise: a superiority he attributed also to God and the supreme good, on the ground that they form the standard to which everything else is referred. For praise applies to virtue, because it is virtue which makes men capable of doing what is noble; but encomiums to definite achievements, whether of body or of mind.

However, to discuss these points fully is perhaps more suitable to a regular treatise on encomiums: it is enough for our purpose that from what has been said it is evident that happiness belongs to the class of things honourable and perfect. And this seems to be the case also because of its being a first principle; for it is for the sake of happiness that we do everything else; and the first principle and cause of good things we assume to be something honourable and divine.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
TENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER XI



SINCE then happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue or excellence, we must now consider what virtue is: for this will probably help us to understand better what happiness is. It seems that the true statesman is chiefly concerned with virtue, for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws, as for example we see in the legislators of the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and other such legislators. But if this inquiry belongs properly to the science of politics, then clearly it will be in accordance with our original design.

We are then to consider virtue, that is, of course, human virtue, because it was the supreme good of man, and the happiness of man that we were in search of.

And by human virtue we mean, not that of the body, but that of the soul; happiness

being, as we have seen, an activity of the soul.

And if this is so, it is clear that some knowledge of the nature of the soul is necessary for the statesman, just as for the oculist a knowledge of the whole body, and all the more so as the science of politics is better and more honourable than the healing art; and in fact the best physicians take a great deal of trouble in acquiring a knowledge of the anatomy of the body.

So then the statesman must consider the nature of the soul: but he must do so with these objects in view, and so far only as his object requires: for to carry his speculations to a greater exactness involves more labour than the subject in hand demands.

In fact, the few statements made on the subject in my popular treatises are quite enough, and accordingly we will adopt them here: as, that the soul consists of two parts, the irrational and the rational. But whether these parts are actually separate, as are the parts of the body, and everything that is capable of division; or whether they are only separable

in thought, being inseparable in fact, as are the convex and the concave of a circle, matters not for our present purpose. But of the irrational part one division seems common to other objects, and in fact vegetative; I mean the cause of nourishment and growth, for such a faculty of the soul one would assume to exist in all things that receive nourishment, even in embryos, and the same faculty to exist in perfect creatures; for it is more reasonable to suppose that this is so, than that it is a different one.

The virtue or excellence of this faculty is manifestly not peculiar to the human species, but common to others; for this part and this faculty are especially active in sleep, and the good and bad man are least distinguishable while asleep; whence it is a common saying, that during the half of life there is no difference between the happy and the miserable. Which is natural enough, for sleep is an inactivity of the soul, in so far as it is denominated good or evil, except some of the emotions find their way, in any degree, through the veil, and so make the dreams of good men better than those of ordinary people. But enough

has been said on this point: we must forego any further mention of the nutritive principle, since it is not naturally capable of the virtue which is peculiarly human.

There seems, however, to be another natural principle of the soul which is irrational, and yet which in a way partakes of reason. For in the continent or incontinent man we praise the reason or rational part of the soul, because it exhorts them to take the course which is right and for the best: but clearly there is in them, besides reason, some other natural principle which fights with and strives against it. For, just as the paralysed limbs of the body, when we would move them to the right are drawn away in a contrary direction to the left, so it is in the case of the soul, for the impulses of incontinent men run counter to reason. The difference is, that in the case of the body we see the part that is drawn away, but in the case of the soul we do not see it. But, none the less must we consider that there is an element in the soul besides reason, which opposes and resists it; though in what sense it is distinct from reason is irrelevant.

But this too does evidently partake of reason, as we have said: for instance, in the continent man it obeys reason: while in the temperate man, or the brave man, it is more obedient still, for in them it entirely agrees with the reason.

So then the irrational part of the soul is plainly twofold: for the merely vegetative part does not participate in reason, whereas that of desire, or appetite generally, does partake of it in a sense, in so far as it is obedient to it and submissive to its rule. But it is obedient to reason in the sense of a child's listening to reason from a father or friends, not in the sense of listening to the reasons of a mathematician.

All advice, reproof, and exhortation prove that the irrational part is in some way amenable to reason. If then we are to say that this part also possesses reason, then the rational part as well as the irrational, will be twofold, the one possessing reason in the strict sense of the term, that is to say in itself, the other listening to reason, as a child listens to its father.

Virtue also then may be divided according to this difference. For we call some of the virtues intellectual, and others moral; philosophy, intelligence, and wisdom, intellectual: liberality and temperance, moral: for in speaking of a man's moral character, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but gentle, or self-controlled: and we praise the wise man in respect of his mental state; and of these mental states such as are praiseworthy we call virtues.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
ELEVENTH CHAPTER

BOOK II

CHAPTER I



IRTUE, then, is of two kinds, intellectual and moral: intellectual virtue depends chiefly for its origin and growth upon teaching, and needs therefore experience and time; whereas moral virtue arises from habit, and so the Greek term denoting it is but a slight deflection from the term denoting habit in that language.

From this fact it is clear that no moral virtue is implanted by nature, because nothing natural can be changed by habit: a stone, for instance, naturally falls downwards, and it never could be trained to rise upwards, not even if one were to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor could fire again be trained to burn downwards, nor in fact could anything, that follows one natural law, be trained by habit to follow

another. The virtues then do not come by nature, nor in defiance of nature, but we are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving them, and this natural capacity is perfected by habit.

Again, in every case of natural endowment we first possess the proper faculties, and afterwards perform the activities, as in the case of the senses, for it was not from having often seen or heard that we acquired the senses of seeing and hearing. On the contrary, we possessed them and then made use of them, but we did not possess them because we had made use of them. But the virtues we acquire by first exercising them, as in the case of the arts also. We learn an art by doing what we wish to do when we have learnt it; for instance, men become builders, by building; and harp-players, by playing on the harp. Similarly, by doing just actions, we become just; by doing temperate actions, we become temperate; and by doing brave actions, brave.

Moreover the experience of states bears testimony to this truth, for the legislators make the citizens good by training them in

good habits, and this is the object of every legislator, and all who do it not well, fail in their purpose; and herein consists the difference between a good state and a bad one.

Again, the circumstances by which every virtue is either produced or destroyed are the same: and it is the same with any of the arts; for it is by playing the harp that both good and bad harp-players are formed: and in like manner builders and all other artificers, for by building well, men will become good builders; and by building badly, bad ones. In fact, if this had not been so, there would have been no need of instructors, but all men would have been at once good or bad in their several arts without them.

It is just the same in the case of the virtues. For by our actions in our intercourse with our fellow-men, we become just or unjust; and by our actions in positions of danger and by habituating ourselves to fear or confidence, we become either brave or cowardly.

Similarly is it also with regard to desire and anger: for some men become temperate and gentle, others become intemperate

and passionate, according to the way in which they conduct themselves in the presence of these impulses. In a word, habits of any kind are the results of actions of the same kind : and so what we have to do, is to give a certain character to these particular actions, because the habits formed vary according to the differences of these.

It does not therefore make a small difference, but rather an all-important one, whether we have been trained from childhood to behave in this way or in that.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FIRST CHAPTER

CHAPTER II



THE object of our present study is not then merely speculative, as it is of some others, for we are enquiring not merely that we may know the nature of virtue, but in order that we may ourselves become virtuous, otherwise there would be no practical benefit to be derived from it. We must therefore consider how we are to perform these actions, because, as we have just said, it is upon these that the character of our habits depends.

That we are to act in accordance with right reason is a general principle, and may for the present be taken for granted: we will discuss hereafter both the nature of right reason and its relations to the other virtues.

But it must be fully admitted at the outset that all reasoning on moral action must be, as it were, in outline, and not scientifically exact: for, as we remarked at the commence-

ment, such reasoning only must be required as the nature of the subject-matter admits of, and questions of conduct and expediency have no fixed rules any more than have questions of health. And if this is true of general reasoning on this subject, still less is exactness attainable in the discussion of particular cases, because these do not fall under any art or system of rules, but it must be left in each instance to the individual agents to look to the exigencies of the particular case, as it is in the art of healing, or that of navigating a ship. Still, though the present subject is confessedly of this nature, we must try and make the best we can of it.

The first point then to be observed is that in matters of this sort defect and excess are alike fatal; as we see in the case of health and strength, for we must use what we can see to illustrate what we cannot see, for too much exercise impairs the strength as well as too little: in like manner, too much food and drink, or too little, impair the health, while the proper proportion produces, increases, and preserves it.

It is the same therefore with the habits of temperance and courage, and the rest of the virtues: for the man who flies from and fears everything, and never makes a stand against anything, becomes a coward; and he who fears nothing, but goes boldly at everything, becomes foolhardy. Similarly, he that indulges in every pleasure and refrains from none, comes to lose all self-control; while he who shuns all, as do the dull and clownish, comes as it were to lose his faculties of perception; that is to say, the habits of temperance and courage are destroyed by excess and defect, but by the mean state are preserved.

But further, not only are habits produced, developed, and destroyed by the same circumstances, but also the actions after the habits are formed will be exercised on the same. For so it is also with other things which are more manifest, strength for instance; for this is acquired by taking plenty of food and doing plenty of work, and the man who has attained strength is best able to do these: and so it is with the virtues, for not only do we, by

abstaining from pleasures acquire temperance, but when we have acquired it, we can best abstain from them. Similarly too with courage, for it is by accustoming ourselves to despise dangers, and to face them, that we become brave; and after we have become so, we shall be best able to face them.

For a test of the matured formation of the habits, we must take the pleasure that attends the actions; for he is temperate who not only abstains from bodily pleasures, but takes pleasure in doing so; whereas he who abstains, but dislikes having to refrain from them, has not self-control: he again is brave who faces danger, either with positive pleasure, or at least without any pain; whereas he who does it with pain is a coward.

For moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains, it is pleasure which makes us do what is wrong, and pain which makes us abstain from doing what is right. And therefore, as Plato observes, men should be so trained from their childhood that they may find pleasure and pain in the proper objects, for this is the right education. Again, if the

virtues have to do with actions and passions, and every passion and every action is attended by pleasure or pain, here again is another proof that virtue is concerned with pleasure and pain. This is shown also by the fact that punishments are inflicted by the use of pleasure and pain; because punishments are of the nature of remedies, and it is the nature of remedies to be the contraries of the ills they cure. Again, as we said before, every habit of the soul by its very nature, has relation to, and exerts itself upon, those things by which it is naturally made better or worse. But such habits become bad by means of pleasures and pains, that is, by men pursuing or avoiding pleasures and pains, either such as they ought not, or at wrong times or in wrong manner, and so forth; for which reason, by the way, some people define the virtues as certain apathetic and quiescent states, but they are wrong because they speak without modification, without adding the qualifying circumstances of manner, time, and so on. We may assume then that virtue is that habit which tends to produce the

best action with regard to pleasures and pains, and that vice is the contrary.

The following considerations may also serve to set this in a clear light. There are principally three things moving us to choice and three to avoidance, the noble, the useful, the pleasant; and their three contraries, the shameful, the hurtful, and the painful; the good man is apt to go right, and the bad man wrong, with respect to all these of course, but most especially with respect to pleasure; because not only is this common to him with all animals, but it is associated with all things that are motives of choice, since both the noble and the expedient appear pleasant.

Again, the love of pleasure grows up with us all from infancy, and so it is difficult to erase this feeling, engrained as it is into our very life.

Again, we all more or less make pleasure and pain the standard even of our actions. For this reason, therefore, the whole of our present study must be concerned with them, since right or wrong impressions of pleasure and pain have an important influence upon

our actions. But further, it is harder, as Heraclitus says, to fight against pleasure than against anger, and it is about that which is more than commonly difficult that art comes into being, and virtue too, because in that which is difficult the good is of a higher order: and so for this reason too both virtue and moral philosophy generally must be altogether occupied with pleasures and pains, because he that makes good use of these will be a good man, and he that makes bad use of them will be a bad man.

Let us then be understood to have stated, that virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains, and that it is either increased or destroyed by the same causes, differently used, by which it is originally produced, and that it exerts itself on the things which were themselves the sources of its origin.

CHAPTER III



UT again, a difficulty may be raised as to the meaning of our statement that men must do just actions to become just, and temperate actions to become temperate. For, it may be said, if men do acts which are just and temperate, they themselves are already just and temperate, just as men are grammarians or musicians if they do what is grammatical and musical. But is this quite true even of the arts? For a man may do something grammatical either by chance or at the suggestion of another; but he will not be a grammarian, unless he not only does something grammatical, but also does it in a grammatical manner, that is, in virtue of his own knowledge of grammar.

Again, the virtues are not in this point analogous to the arts. For the products of the arts have their excellence in themselves,

and it is enough therefore that, when they are produced, they should be of a certain quality. But in the case of the virtues, actions are not called just or temperate if they are merely actions of a certain sort, but only when certain conditions are fulfilled by him who does them ; that is, in the first place, he must know what it is that he is doing ; secondly, he must choose to do it for its own sake ; and thirdly, he must so act from a firm and unalterable disposition of mind. Now to constitute possession of the arts these conditions are not taken into account, except indeed the condition of knowledge : but for the possession of the virtues knowledge is of little or no avail, while the other conditions that result from repeatedly doing what is just and temperate are not of little but of the whole importance.

Actions, then, are called just or temperate when they are such as the just or temperate man would do : but the just and temperate man is not merely one who does these actions, but one who does them in the spirit of the just or temperate man.

We are right then in saying, that a man

becomes just by doing what is just, and temperate by doing what is temperate; and no one if he neglects such actions, would ever have the remotest chance of becoming a good man. Yet most people, instead of doing thus, take refuge in talk about what is right, and flatter themselves they are philosophising, and that they will so become good men; acting in truth like sick people, who listen to the doctor with great attention, but do nothing that he tells them. And as surely as a healthy state of the body cannot be produced under such a course of treatment, so neither can a healthy state of the soul be produced by such philosophising.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
THIRD CHAPTER

CHAPTER IV



WE must next consider what virtue is. Now, as the qualities of the soul are, in all, of these kinds, emotions, capacities, and habits, virtue must of course belong to one of the three classes.

By emotions, I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, emulation, compassion, in short, whatever is followed by pleasure or pain : by capacities, those in respect of which we are said to be capable of experiencing these emotions ; that is, in respect of which we are able to have been made angry, or grieved, or to have pity ; by habits, those in respect of which we are well or ill regulated towards the emotions ; as to having been made angry, for instance, we are ill regulated if our anger were too violent or too slack, but if it were moderate, we are well regulated. And so with the rest.

Now, neither the virtues nor the vices are emotions, because with reference to our emotions we are not called good or bad, as we are with reference to our virtues and vices.

Again, with reference to our emotions we are not praised or blamed; a man is not praised for being afraid or being angry, nor blamed for being angry merely, but only for being angry in a particular way, but with reference to our virtues and vices we are praised or blamed.

Again, we feel both anger and fear without deliberate purpose, whereas the virtues are acts of deliberate purpose, or at least certainly not independent of it.

Moreover, with reference to the emotions we are said to be moved, but with reference to our virtues and vices we are not said to be moved, but to be disposed in a certain way.

And for these same reasons, they are not capacities, for we are not called good or bad merely because we are capable of emotion, nor are we praised or blamed for this.

And again, capacities we have by nature,

but we do not become good or bad by nature, as we have said before.

Since then the virtues are neither emotions nor capacities, it remains that they must be habits.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FOURTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER V



WE have thus found what is the genus of virtue, but it is not enough merely to state that it is a habit ; we must also indicate what species of habit it is.

We must observe then, that every excellence or virtue perfects that thing of which it is the excellence, and enables it to perform its function well. The excellence of the eye, for instance, makes both the eye good, and its function also ; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. So too the excellence of the horse makes a horse good, and good in speed, and carrying his rider, and standing up against the enemy. If then this is universally true, the excellence or virtue of man will be the habit that makes a man good, and enables him to perform his proper function well. Now how this is to be brought about we have said already, but we shall make the matter still

clearer if we now consider what the nature of this virtue is.

In every quantity then, whether continuous or divisible, it is possible to take a greater, a smaller, or an equal amount, and this either with reference to the thing itself, or relatively to ourselves, the equal amount being a mean between excess and deficiency. By the mean of the thing, that is, absolute mean, I understand that which is equidistant from both extremes, which of course is one and the same for all. By the mean relatively to ourselves, I understand that which is neither too much nor too little for the particular individual. This of course is not one nor the same for all: for instance, suppose ten be too much and two be too little, we take six as the mean in respect of the thing itself; because it exceeds the smaller sum by exactly as much as it is itself exceeded by the larger, and this is the mean according to arithmetical proportion.

But the mean relatively to ourselves must not be found in this way, for it does not follow that if ten pounds of meat be too much for a man to eat and two pounds be too little, that the

trainer will order him six pounds, for this also may be too much or too little for the person who is to take it; for Milo, for example, it would be too little, but for a man just commencing his athletic exercises it would be too much; similarly too of the exercises themselves, as running or wrestling.

Thus then every one who has knowledge avoids excess and deficiency, and seeks for and chooses the mean, the mean, that is, not of the thing itself, but relatively to ourselves.

If then every science thus perfects its work by keeping the mean steadily in view, and bringing its work up to this standard, so that people are wont to say of excellent works, 'one cannot add to or take aught from them,' implying that excess or deficiency destroy the excellence, but that the mean state preserves it. Good artists, as we have said, work with the mean in view. But virtue, like nature, is more exact and better than any art in the world, therefore virtue must also aim at the mean.

It is moral virtue, of course, which I mean, because it is moral virtue which is concerned with our emotions and actions, and in these

there can be excess and defect, and the mean. It is possible, for instance, to feel the emotions of fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and pleasure and pain generally, too much or too little, and in either case wrongly; but to feel these emotions at the right times, and on the right occasions, and towards the right persons, from the right motive, and in the right manner, is the mean, or in other words the best state, which is the characteristic of virtue.

In like manner too with respect to actions, there may be excess and deficiency, and the mean. But virtue is concerned with emotions and actions, in which excess is wrong and deficiency also is blamed, whereas the mean is praised and is right: both of which are characteristics of virtue; virtue then is in a sense a mean state, in that it aims at that which is the mean.

Again, one may go wrong in many different ways, because, as the Pythagoreans expressed it, evil is of the infinite, good of the finite, but right only in one way; and so the former is easy, the latter difficult; it is easy to miss the mark, but difficult to hit it: and for these

reasons, therefore, both excess and deficiency are characteristics of vice, and the mean state a characteristic of virtue ; for, as a poet has it, 'Men may be bad in many ways, but good in one alone.'

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FIFTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VI



IRTUE then is a habit of choosing what is the mean relatively to ourselves, as determined by reason, and as the prudent man would determine it.

It is the mean between two vices, one of excess, the other of defect : and it is so moreover, because the vices sometimes fall short of what is right in our feelings and actions, and sometimes exceed it, but virtue finds and chooses the mean.

So that in its essence and according to its real definition, virtue is a mean state ; but viewed in its relation to the highest good and to excellence, it is the highest state possible.

But it is not every action or every feeling that admits of a mean state, because there are some whose very names imply badness, as malevolence, shamelessness, envy ; or, to instance actions, adultery, theft, murder. For all these and such like are blamed, because

they are in themselves bad, and not because the excess or deficiency of them is bad.

It is impossible then to be right in respect of them, they must always be wrong; right or wrong in such actions as adultery does not depend on whether it is the right person, time, or manner, but the mere doing of any one of them is wrong.

You might as well insist upon a mean, and an excess, and a deficiency in unjust, cowardly, or intemperate actions: for then there would be a mean state of an excess or of a deficiency, an excess of an excess and a deficiency of a deficiency.

But just as in temperance and courage there can be no excess or deficiency, because the mean is in one point of view the highest possible state, so, in neither of the vices we have been speaking of, can you have a mean, or an excess, or a deficiency, but howsoever done they are wrong: for you cannot, in short, have a mean state of excess and deficiency, nor an excess and deficiency of a mean state.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
SIXTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VII



IT is not enough, however, to state this in general terms, we must also apply it to particular cases, because in treatises on moral conduct general statements have an air of vagueness, but those which go into particulars have greater reality. For actions after all must be concerned with particulars, and general statements, to be worth anything, must hold good when applied to these particulars.

We must take these particular cases then from the recognised list of the virtues.

In respect of feelings of fear and confidence or boldness, courage is the mean state : of those that exceed, he who shows excess of fearlessness has no name, as often happens, but he who exceeds in confidence is called foolhardy, while he who has too much fear and too little confidence, is called cowardly.

In respect of pleasures and pains, but not

indeed of all pleasures and pains, and perhaps of fewer pains than pleasures, temperance is the mean state, and intemperance the excess. As for deficiency in regard to pleasures, there are really no people who are chargeable with it, so, of course, there is really no name for such characters, but as they are conceivable we will give them one, and call them insensible.

In respect of giving and taking money: the mean state is liberality, the excess prodigality, the defect stinginess: here each of the extremes involves really an excess and defect contrary to those of the others: I mean, the prodigal gives out too much and takes in too little, while the stingy man takes in too much and gives out too little. We are now giving merely an outline and summary, intentionally: and we shall, in a later part of the treatise, draw out the distinctions with greater exactness.

In respect of money, there are other dispositions besides these just mentioned. There is the mean state called munificence; for the munificent man differs from the liberal, the former having necessarily to do with large

sums of money, the latter with but small; and the excess called by the names either of bad taste, or vulgarity; the deficiency is meanness. These vices also differ from the extremes connected with liberality, and the nature of their difference shall be explained later.

In respect of honour and dishonour: the mean state is highmindedness, excess is what is called vanity, and the deficiency little-mindedness.

In respect of honour and dishonour: there is a quality bearing the same relation to highmindedness as we said just now liberality does to munificence, with the difference that is of being about a small amount of the same thing: this quality having reference to small honour, as highmindedness to great honour. For it is possible to desire honour in the right way, and again, to desire it too much or too little. The man who desires it in excess is called ambitious, he who is defective in the desire for it is called unambitious, while he who observes the mean has no name. The dispositions too are nameless, except that the disposition of

the ambitious man is called ambition. For this reason those who are in either extreme lay claim to the mean as a debateable land, and we sometimes call the man who is in the mean ambitious, and sometimes unambitious, and we praise sometimes the one and sometimes the other. Why we do so shall be explained hereafter; but we will now go on with the rest of the virtues after the plan we have laid down.

In respect of anger also, there is excess, deficiency, and a mean state. These states can hardly be said to have names of their own, but as we call the man who is in the mean state gentle, we will call the mean state itself gentleness. Of the extremes, let the man who is excessive be denominated passionate, and his vice passionateness, and him who is deficient impassive, and the defect impassivity.

There are also three other mean states, having a certain resemblance to one another, but which still are different from one another. They are alike in that they are all concerned with intercourse in speech and action, and

they differ in that one has to do with truthfulness in such intercourse, the other two with pleasantness, and this in two ways, the one with pleasantness in amusement, the other with pleasantness in all the relations of daily life. We must say a word or two about these also, that we may the better see that in all cases the mean state is praiseworthy, while the extremes are neither right nor praiseworthy, but blamable.

Now of these, it is true, the majority are really without names, but still we must try, as in the other cases, to coin some for them for the sake of clearness and intelligibility.

In respect of truth, the man who is in the mean state we will call truthful, and his state truthfulness. Pretence, on the other hand, when it exaggerates, may be called boasting, and he who is guilty of pretence is a boaster, but if it depreciates, it is irony, and he who is guilty of it is ironical.

With regard to pleasantness in amusement, the man who is in the mean state shall be called witty, and his state wittiness. The ex-

cess is buffoonery, and the man who is guilty of it is a buffoon; and, on the other hand, he who is deficient in wit is a boor, and his state boorishness.

With regard to pleasantness in daily life, he that is as he should be may be called friendly, and his mean state friendliness: he that goes to excess, if it be without any interested motive, is complaisant, but if with such motive, a flatterer: he that is deficient, and always makes himself unpleasant, is quarrelsome and disagreeable.

There are mean states likewise in the emotions and in the matters concerning them. Shame, for instance, is not a virtue, and yet a man is praised for being modest. For in these matters we say that such a man is in the mean state, and that such another goes to excess, the bashful man, for instance, who is overwhelmed with shame on all and any occasions; the man who is deficient in this respect or who has no shame at all in his composition is called shameless; while the man who is in the mean is modest.

Righteous indignation, again, is a mean

between envy and malevolence. They all three have to do with the pleasure and pain which we feel at what happens to our neighbours; for the man who is righteously indignant is grieved at undeserved success of others, while the envious man goes further and is grieved at the success of all alike, while the malevolent falls so far short of being pained, that he even rejoices in the misfortunes of others.

But for the discussion of these matters also there will be another opportunity, as of justice too, because the term is used in more senses than one. So elsewhere we will distinguish between its two kinds and show how each of them is a mean state: and in like manner we will treat of the intellectual virtues.

CHAPTER VIII



HERE are then three dispositions, two being vices either in the way of excess or of defect, and one virtue, which is the mean state, and they are of course all in a certain sense opposed to one another; the extremes, for instance, are opposed not only to the mean, but also to one another, and the mean is opposed to both the extremes. For just as the equal if compared with the less portion is greater, and if compared with the greater is less, so the mean states, compared with the the deficiencies, exceed, whether in emotions or actions, and vice versa. The brave man, for instance, appears foolhardy when compared with the coward, and cowardly when compared with the foolhardy; similarly too the temperate man appears intemperate if compared with the insensible, but if compared with the intemperate man he appears insen-

sible ; and the liberal man compared with the stingy seems prodigal, and by the side of the prodigal, stingy.

And so the extreme characters mutually repel the man in the mean state ; the brave man is called foolhardy by the coward, and cowardly by the foolhardy, and so on in the other cases. And there being this mutual opposition between the extremes and the mean, the opposition between the two extremes is greater than the opposition between either of the two extremes and the mean, because they are further removed from one another than from the mean, just as the greater or less portion differ more from each other than either from the exact half.

Again, in some cases an extreme will bear a resemblance to the mean, foolhardiness, for instance, to courage, and prodigality to liberality ; but between the extremes there is the greatest possible dissimilarity. But things which are furthest removed from one another are defined to be opposites, so that the further things are removed from each other, the greater is the opposition between them.

In some cases the excess, and in others the deficiency, is the more opposed to the mean; to courage, for instance, not foolhardiness, which is the excess, but cowardice, which is the deficiency; whereas to temperance, not insensibility, which is the deficiency, but intemperance, which is the excess.

For this there are two reasons to be given; one lies in the nature of the thing itself, since one extreme is nearer and more similar to the mean, we naturally do not oppose it to the mean so strongly as the other; for instance, since foolhardiness is thought to be nearer to courage than cowardice is, and to resemble it more, we set cowardice against courage rather than foolhardiness, because those things which are further from the mean are thought to be more opposite to it. This then is one reason arising from the thing itself; there is another arising from our own constitution and make: for in each man's own case those things give the impression of being more opposed to the mean to which we individually are naturally inclined. Thus we are naturally more inclined towards pleasures, and

therefore we are much more inclined towards intemperance than decency.

These things then, towards which our inclination tends, we call more opposed to the mean, and so intemperance, which is the excess, is more opposed to temperance than is insensibility.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
EIGHTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER IX



NOW we have fully shown that moral virtue is a mean state, and in what sense it is so. It is a mean between two vices, the one of excess, the other of defect, and it is so because it aims at the mean both in our emotions and in our actions.

Hence it is a hard task to be good. For it is a hard task to find the mean in anything, just as it is not every one who can find the mean point or centre of a circle, but only the man who knows how to do it. And so, too, to get angry, to give money away, or to spend it, is an easy matter, and what any man can do: but to do these things to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right object, and in the right manner, is not what every one can do, nor is it easy; and that is the reason why goodness is rare, and praiseworthy, and noble.

Therefore he who aims at the mean should make it his first care to keep away from that extreme, which is the more contrary to the mean; just as Calypso advises Ulysses, 'Clear of this smoke and surge thy barque direct;' for of the two extremes, one is a more dangerous error than the other. Since then it is difficult to hit the mean precisely, we must, as the proverb says, 'row when we cannot sail,' and choose the lesser of two evils; and this we shall best do in the way we have mentioned.

We ought also to take into consideration the things to which we are ourselves naturally inclined, as different natures have different inclinations, and we may discover what these are, by the feelings of pleasure or pain attendant upon particular acts. And then we must force ourselves in the opposite direction, for, by removing ourselves as far as possible from what is wrong, we shall be more likely to arrive at the mean, exactly as we do in endeavouring to straighten a bent stick.

But in all cases we must be especially on our guard against what is pleasant, and against

pleasure itself, because we are not impartial judges of pleasure.

We ought in fact to treat pleasure as the old counsellors treated Helen, and in all cases repeat their sentence; for, if we dismiss pleasure as they dismissed Helen, we shall be less likely to go wrong.

To speak briefly, if we act thus, we shall best be able to hit the mean.

Yet this, it must be admitted, is a difficult task, especially in particular instances. It is not easy, for instance, to determine exactly how, and with whom, and for what, and for how long, we ought to feel anger. For we ourselves sometimes praise those who are deficient in this feeling, and call them gentle; and sometimes those who are easily angered, and call them manly.

Then, again, he who deviates a little from what is right, be it on the side of too much or too little, is not blamed, but only he who deviates a great deal, for he cannot escape observation. But, how far or to what extent a man must err in order to incur blame, it is not easy to determine by reasoning; neither is

it easy to determine anything else that falls within the scope of perception. Such questions are matters of detail, and our judgment of them depends upon our perception.

So much then is plain, that the mean state is always praiseworthy, but that we must sometimes incline towards excess, and sometimes towards deficiency, for in this way we shall most easily hit the mean, and do what is right.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
NINTH CHAPTER

BOOK III

CHAPTER I



NOW since virtue is concerned with our emotions and actions, and praise or blame is only given to such emotions and actions as are voluntary, while to those that are involuntary pardon is given, and sometimes even pity, it is perhaps necessary for those who are investigating the nature of virtue, to distinguish exactly between what is voluntary and what is involuntary; and such a distinction will certainly be useful to legislators in the assigning of honours and punishments.

Involuntary actions then are thought to be of two kinds, being done under compulsion, or through ignorance.

An action is, properly speaking, compulsory, when its origin is external to the agent, being such, that the agent, or rather the

patient, contributes nothing thereto; as, for instance, if he were carried anywhere by the wind, or by men who had him in their power.

But when actions are done, either from fear of greater evils, or for some noble end, as, for instance, if you were ordered to commit some base act by a tyrant who had your parents or children in his power, and they were to be saved upon your compliance, or die upon your refusal, it is a question whether such actions are voluntary or involuntary.

A similar question arises with respect to cases of throwing goods overboard in a storm; abstractedly, no man willingly throws away his property, but with a view to his own and his shipmates' safety, any one who had any sense would do so.

The truth is, such actions are of a mixed kind, but are more like voluntary than involuntary actions; for they are desired or chosen at the time when they are done, and the end or object of an action must be taken with reference to the actual occasion. Further, we must denominate an action voluntary or involuntary at the time of doing it: now in the

given case the man acts voluntarily, because the originating of the motion of his limbs in such actions rests with himself; and where the origination is in himself, it is in his power to do or not to do.

Such actions then are voluntary, though in the abstract they are perhaps involuntary, for no one would choose any such action for its own sake.

For actions of this kind men are sometimes praised, as when they endure any disgrace or pain for the sake of some great and noble end; but in the contrary case they are blamed, for none but a bad man would submit to what is disgraceful when no noble end was in view, or but a trifling one.

In some cases, again, no praise is given, but rather pardon; as when a man does what he ought not to do, owing to causes which overstrain the powers of human nature, or which pass the limits of human endurance.

There are perhaps some acts for which compulsion cannot be pleaded, a man ought rather to suffer the most dreadful death than do them; how absurd, for instance, are the

pleas of compulsion with which Alcmaëon in Euripides' Play excuses his matricide.

It is sometimes difficult to decide what ought to be chosen, or what endured, and much more so to abide by one's decisions; for generally the alternatives are painful, and the actions required are base, and so praise and blame is awarded according as we do or do not yield to constraint.

What kind of actions then are to be called compulsory? Actions, it may be said, are compulsory in the abstract when the cause is external to the agent and he contributes nothing to it. And that where the acts are in themselves such as one would not wish, but chosen at a particular time and for a particular end, and where the origination rests with the agent, then although the actions are in themselves involuntary, they are at that time and for that end voluntary. Such actions are more like voluntary than involuntary actions, however, for actions take place under particular circumstances, and these are voluntary.

But what kind of things one ought to choose

for certain ends, it is not easy to settle, for there are many differences in particular instances.

Suppose it should be said that things pleasant and honourable are done by compulsion, because, being external, they compel a person to act. But if this were so, every action we do is compulsory, because these are the motives of every act of every man.

Again, those who act on compulsion and against their will, do so with pain ; while those who act with what is pleasant or honourable in view do so with pleasure.

It is truly absurd for a man to attribute his actions to external things, instead of to himself for being so easily caught by such things ; or, again, to ascribe the noble acts to himself, and the base ones to pleasure.

So then the compulsory appears to be that of which the origin is external to the agent, and to which the person compelled contributes nothing.

CHAPTER II



VERY action of which ignorance is the cause is non-voluntary, but it is involuntary only when it is attended with pain and remorse.

For clearly the man who has done any thing through ignorance, and yet is not vexed at what he has done, cannot be said to have done it voluntarily, because he did not know what he was doing, nor involuntarily, because he is not sorry for it.

So that when a person who has acted through ignorance, if he afterwards feels regret is held to have acted involuntarily, but if he feels no regret, we will, to distinguish, call his act non-voluntary ; for as there is this difference, it is better to have a distinct name.

Again, there seems to be a difference between acting through ignorance and acting in ignorance ; for instance, when a man is drunk or in a passion he is not regarded as acting

from ignorance, but as acting from intoxication or rage, yet he does not act knowingly, but in ignorance.

And so, too, every vicious man is ignorant of what he ought to do and of what he ought not to do, and it is because of such ignorance that men become unjust and wholly depraved.

But yet the term involuntary cannot be applied merely because a man is ignorant of his own true interest. The ignorance that makes an act involuntary is not such ignorance as affects moral choice, for this constitutes vice, nor again is it ignorance of the universal, for, for ignorance of this kind men are blamed, but it is rather ignorance of the particulars, that is, ignorance of the particular details and circumstances of the action. For in these cases, there is pity and pardon, for he who acts in ignorance of any of these particulars acts involuntarily.

It may be as well, therefore, to define the nature and number of these particulars.

They are, first the agent, secondly the act, thirdly the circumstances of the act; sometimes also the instrument with which it is

done, the motive for which it is done, protection, for instance, and the way in which it is done, gently or violently.

No man in his senses could be ignorant of all these particulars; plainly he could not be ignorant of the agent, for how can a person be ignorant of himself. But of what he is doing a man may be ignorant, as when in conversation men say a word escaped them unawares; or that they did not know the subject was forbidden, as Æschylus did with respect to the Mysteries; or as in the case of that catapult accident the other day, the man said he discharged it merely to show how it worked. Or a person might take his son to be an enemy, as Merope did; or think that a spear which was really pointed was rounded off; or that a stone was only a pumice-stone; or he might kill a man with a blow that was intended to save him; or he might deal a heavy blow when merely wishing to show another how to hit, as people do in sparring.

Ignorance, therefore, being possible with regard to all these particular circumstances with which the action is concerned, it follows

that he who acted in ignorance of any of them is thought to have acted involuntarily, and especially if he was ignorant of the most important, which are, it would seem, the persons concerned in the action, and the result.

Further, if an action is to be called involuntary on the ground of such ignorance, it must also be understood that the action is followed by feelings of pain and regret in the agent.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
SECOND CHAPTER

CHAPTER III



SINCE, then, an action is involuntary when done under compulsion or from ignorance, it would seem to follow that a voluntary action is one whose origin is in the agent, he being aware of the particular circumstances under which the action takes place.

For, it may be, we are not justified in calling actions which are done from anger or desire, involuntary.

Because, in the first place, if this be so, no animal can ever be said to act voluntarily, neither can children; and, secondly, is it meant that nothing which we do from desire or anger is voluntary, or that in doing what is noble we act voluntarily, and involuntarily in doing what is disgraceful? Surely the latter supposition is absurd, since in each case the cause is one and the same; while with regard to the former, it is surely strange to maintain

that such things as we ought to desire, are desired involuntarily. There are certain things at which it is right to be angry, and there are certain things which we ought to desire, such as health and learning, for instance.

Again, it seems that actions which are involuntary give pain, while those which are done to gratify desire are pleasant.

Again; what difference is there in respect of involuntariness between wrong actions done upon deliberate calculation, and wrong actions done in anger? For they both ought to be avoided, and the irrational feelings seem to be just as much a part of man's nature as reason itself, and so of course must be such actions of the individual as are done through anger and desire. It is absurd then to class these actions among the involuntary.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
THIRD CHAPTER

CHAPTER IV



HAVING thus defined the distinction between voluntary and involuntary action, our next step is to examine into the nature of moral purpose, because this seems most intimately connected with virtue, and to be a better test of moral character than even our acts are.

Now moral purpose is clearly voluntary, but the two are not identical, voluntary being the more comprehensive term: for first, children and all other animals share in voluntary action, but not in moral purpose; and next, we call actions done under sudden impulse voluntary, but not as being done with moral purpose.

But those who say it is desire or anger, or wish, or an opinion of some kind do not seem to be correct; because in the first place, moral purpose is not shared by the irrational animals,

while desire and anger are. Next; the incontinent man acts from desire, but not from moral purpose; on the other hand, the continent man acts from moral purpose, not from desire. Again, whereas desire is frequently opposed to moral purpose, one desire is not opposed to another desire.

Lastly, the object of desire is the pleasant or the painful, but the object of moral purpose is not of necessity either the one or the other. Still less can moral purpose be identified with anger, because actions done in anger seem least of all to be done with moral purpose.

Neither is moral purpose to be identified with wish, though it appears to be closely connected with it; because, in the first place, moral purpose does not apply to impossibilities, and if a man were to say that he purposed that which is impossible, he would be thought to be a fool: but we can wish for that which is impossible, immortality for instance.

Again, we may wish for things the accomplishment of which we have no power to effect, as the success of any particular actor or athlete; but no man ever purposes such

things as these, but only such as he believes could be effected by his own action.

Again, wish has for its object rather the end, but moral purpose the means to the end ; for instance, we wish to be healthy, but we choose the means which will make us so ; or again we wish to be happy, and confess the wish, but to say that we purpose or choose to be happy is not an appropriate term, because, in short, moral purpose seems to be concerned only with such things as are in our own power.

Neither can moral purpose be opinion : for opinion seems to be unlimited in its range of objects, and to be exercised as well upon things eternal and impossible, as on those which are in our own power. Opinion, too, is divided into true and false, not into good and bad, as is moral purpose.

However, perhaps nobody maintains the identity of moral purpose with opinion generally ; but neither is it identical with opinion of any particular kind, because by purposing what is good or evil, we are constituted of a certain character, and not by the opinions which we may have.

Again, we choose to take or avoid a good or evil thing, and so on, but we opine what its nature is, or for what it is serviceable, or in what way: but we do not opine to take or avoid.

Further, moral purpose is commended rather for having a right end than for being correct, but opinion for being formed in accordance with truth.

Again, we purpose or choose such things as we best know to be good, but we form opinions of things of which we know nothing.

And it seems that those who are best at choosing are not always the best at forming opinions, but that some who form better opinions than others fail through vice to choose the things which they ought.

It may be urged, that opinion always precedes or accompanies moral purpose, but this makes no difference, for this is not the point in question, but whether moral purpose is identical with opinion of a certain kind.

Since then it is none of the things which have been mentioned; what is the nature of moral purpose, or how is it characterised?

Voluntary it plainly is, but yet all voluntary action is not done with moral purpose. May we not say then, it is that voluntary which has passed through a stage of previous deliberation? because moral purpose involves reasoning and intellectual process. The etymology of its Greek name seems to signify this, implying that something is 'chosen in preference to other things.'

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FOURTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER V



OW do men deliberate about everything, and is everything a matter for deliberation, or are there some things about which deliberation is impossible. It may be as well perhaps to say, that by 'a matter for deliberation' is meant that about which a sensible person would deliberate, not that about which a fool or madman might.

No one deliberates about eternal or unalterable things: as, for instance, the universe, or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square; or about things which are in motion, but always follow the same course, whether of necessity, or by nature, or from some other cause, as, for instance, the solstices or the sunrise: or about things which are quite irregular, as droughts and rains; or about matters of chance, as the finding of a treasure.

Nor in fact are all human affairs matters of deliberation; no Lacedæmonian, for instance, deliberates as to how the Scythians may best be governed. The reason why we do not deliberate about these things is that none of them are things that could be effected by us.

But the things that we do deliberate about are such practical matters as are in our power, which are indeed the only matters which now remain; for it would seem that the causes of things are nature, necessity, and chance, and besides these only reason and all human agency.

And men, in each case, deliberate about such practical matters as are in their own individual power.

Further, about such branches of knowledge as are exact and complete in themselves, there is no room for deliberation: as, for instance, about writing, because we are never in doubt how the letters should be formed. We deliberate, then, about all such things that are brought about by our own agency, but not always in the same way; as, for instance, about medicine, or about money-making, and about navigation more than about gymnastic

exercises, because it has been less exactly determined, and so forth in all other cases; and more about the arts than the sciences, because we are more frequently in doubt about them.

Deliberation, then, takes place in such matters as fall under a general rule, and in which the issue is, in each particular case, uncertain, and so, cannot be predicted. And for matters of great importance, we invite the help of other people in our deliberations, distrusting our own ability to settle them alone.

Further, we deliberate not about ends, but about the means to ends. For instance, a physician does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall make good laws, nor in fact any man in any other profession about his particular end; but having set before them a certain end, they consider how and through what means it may be attained; and should it appear that it can be attained by various means, they further consider which is the easiest and best; and if there is only one means of attaining it, then how it may be attained by this means, and

so on, till they come to the first cause, which is the last to be discovered. For in deliberation we seem to investigate and analyse the subject in the way described, like we analyse a geometrical problem. Indeed, although all investigation is not deliberation, mathematical investigation for instance is not, yet all deliberation is a kind of investigation, that which is last in the analysis coming first in the order of construction. If we come upon an impossibility, we abandon the plan; if there is need of money, for instance, and money cannot be got: but if it appears possible, we set to work.

By possible, I mean something that may be effected by our own actions; and what is effected by our friends is in a way effected by ourselves, because the origin in such cases rests with ourselves. The question is sometimes what are the necessary instruments, sometimes the method of using them; and so, too, in other cases, the question is sometimes what means will produce the desired effect, and sometimes how to use them, or whose agency to employ.

It seems, as has been said, that a man's

actions originate in himself. Deliberation is concerned with such things as may be done by a man himself, and actions are done for the sake of some end in view; so that it is not the end, but the means to the end, which is the object of deliberation.

Nor, again, will particular questions of fact be matters of deliberation, as whether the substance before me is a loaf, or whether it has been properly baked; for these are matters of immediate perception, and if a man goes on deliberating for ever he will never come to an end.

But the objects of deliberation and moral purpose are the same, except that the object of moral purpose is already fixed and determined, for the object of moral purpose is that which is preferred after deliberation. For everybody ceases to deliberate how he shall act when he has traced the origin of his action back to himself, that is, to the governing principle in himself, because it is this which makes the choice. A good illustration of this is furnished by the old regal constitutions which Homer described, in which the kings

announced to the people the measures which they had determined upon.

Since then, the object of moral purpose is something in our own power, which is the object of deliberation and desire, moral purpose must be a deliberate desire for something which is in our own power, for we first deliberate upon a thing, and then, having made our decision, we desire it in accordance with the result of our deliberation.

Let this be accepted as a sketch of the nature and object of moral purpose, that object being means to ends.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FIFTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VI



WE have already said that the wish has for its object the end; but there are some who think that its object is the good, and others that it is what seems to be good.

Those who maintain that the object of wish is the good must admit that what is wished for by him who chooses wrongly is not really an object of wish, for if it was, it must be good, but it is, in the case supposed, bad. Those who maintain, on the other hand, that it is what seems to be good which is the object of wish, have to admit that there is nothing which is naturally an object of wish, but that each individual wishes for whatever seems good to him, different and even opposite things seeming good to different people.

But, if neither of these conclusions quite satisfies us, it will perhaps be best to say that the abstract and true object of wish is the good, but to each individual the object of wish

is whatever seems to him to be good. And so the good man wishes for what is really good, and the bad man may wish for anything whether good or bad, just as with regard to the body those who are in good health find those things wholesome, which are truly wholesome, while those who are in bad health find other things wholesome. And so, too, of things bitter and sweet, and hot and heavy, and so on. For the good man judges everything rightly, and in every instance that which is true appears true to him.

For there are good and pleasant things peculiar to, and varying with each state; and perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of the good man is his seeing the truth in every instance, he being, as it were, the rule and measure of these matters.

The majority of men seem to be deceived by pleasure, because, though it is not really a good, it impresses their minds with the notion of goodness, so they choose what is pleasant as good, and avoid pain as an evil.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
SIXTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VII



SINCE, then, it is the end which is the object of wish, and the means to the end which are the objects of deliberation and moral purpose, the actions which are concerned with means must be done with moral purpose, and so will be voluntary. But the acts in which the virtues are manifested are concerned with these means. Therefore virtue is in our own power, and so too is vice, because wherever it is in our power to do a thing, it is also in our power to abstain from doing it, and vice versa. Hence, if it is in our power to do a thing, which is noble, it will also be in our power to abstain from doing it, which is shameful; and if to abstain from doing a thing, which is noble, be in our power, then to do it, which is shameful, will be also in our power.

But if it is in our power to do and likewise

to abstain from doing what is noble and what is shameful, and if so to act, or not to act constitutes our being good or bad, then it follows that it is in our own power to be virtuous or vicious.

So the well-known saying, ‘None would be wicked, none would not be blessed,’ seems to be partly true and partly false: for no man is happy against his will, of course, but vice is voluntary. If this be denied, we must dispute the statements lately made, and say that a man is not the originator or generator of his actions, as of his children.

But if these statements seem to be true, and we cannot refer our actions to any other sources than those that are in our own power, then those things whose sources are within us must themselves be in our own power and so be voluntary.

This seems to be supported by the testimony both of private individuals and of law-givers too, for they chastise and punish those who do wrong, unless it be done under compulsion, or through ignorance for which they cannot be held responsible; while they honour

those who act rightly, with a view to encourage the latter and to restrain the former. But no one thinks of encouraging us to do such things as are not in our own power or voluntary, knowing it to be of no avail for one to have been persuaded not to be hot, or cold, or hungry, and so forth, because we shall have those sensations all the same.

And what makes the case stronger is this, that they punish for the very fact of ignorance, when it is thought to be self-caused; to the drunken, for instance, the penalties are doubled, because the origin of the offence lies in the man himself: for it was in his power not to get drunk, and the drunkenness was the cause of his ignorance.

Again, they punish those who are ignorant of legal regulations which they ought to know, and which are not hard to know, and similarly in all other cases where the ignorance is thought to be the result of negligence, for they had it in their power to avoid their ignorance if they had paid attention.

But it may be urged that perhaps a man is of such a character that he cannot give

attention to such things. To which it may be answered that men are themselves responsible for having acquired such a character by a dissolute life, and for being unjust or intemperate in consequence of wrong-doing, or by spending their time in drinking and other such things, because specific acts form a corresponding character, as is shewn by those who are training for any contest or performance, for such men practise continually the particular act required.

As for the plea, that a man did not know that habits are formed by the practice of particular acts, we reply that such ignorance shows that a person must be utterly senseless.

And further, it is absurd to say that the man who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust, or that the man who acts intemperately does not wish to be intemperate; for if a man knowingly does certain acts which must make him unjust, he is to all intents and purposes voluntarily unjust; it does not follow that he can, if he desires it, cease to be unjust, and become just, any more than it follows that a sick

man can, if he wishes it, be well again. It may happen that he is voluntarily ill, because he has produced his sickness by living intemperately and disregarding his physicians. If so, he had it once in his power not to be ill, but now that he has lost his self-control, it is so no longer; just as he who has thrown a stone cannot recall it, and yet it rested with him to throw it, for the original action was in his power. Just so the unjust man, and the intemperate man, originally had it in their power not to be what they are, and so they are voluntarily unjust or intemperate; and now that they have become so, they no longer have the power of being otherwise.

And not only are mental or moral vices voluntary, but the vices of the body are so in some cases, and are then accordingly censured; for no one blames such as are naturally deformed, but only such as are so by reason of want of exercise, and neglect. And so too of weakness and infirmity: no one would think of upbraiding a man who is born blind, or whose blindness is the consequence of an accident, but would rather pity him; but every one

would censure him who was so from excess of wine, or any other kind of intemperance. It seems, then, in respect of bodily diseases, that those which depend on ourselves are censured, and that those which do not are not censured. And if so, then in the case of the mental disorders, those which are censured must depend upon ourselves.

But suppose it is said that although all men aim at that which appears to be good, yet they have no control over the appearance, but that upon each man's character, depends what shall appear to him to be the end. If each man then is in a way responsible for his own moral state, so he will be also for this appearance ; but if not, no one is responsible for his own evil doing, but he does evil through ignorance of the true end, thinking that by such means he will secure the chief good. In other words, that this aiming at the end is not a matter of one's own choice, but one must be born with a power of mental vision, so to speak, whereby to judge rightly, and choose that which is really good ; and he is favoured by nature who naturally possesses

this gift, for it is the most important thing and the fairest, and what a man cannot acquire or learn from another, but will have just as nature has given it; and to possess this gift well and excellently bestowed by nature, is to have perfect and true nobility of nature.

If all this be true, how will virtue be any more voluntary than vice? For both alike for the good and the bad man, the end is apparent, and is determined by nature or by some other agency, and they refer all their acts of whatever kind to it.

Whether then the end does not naturally appear to every man, but in part depends on himself, or whether the end is determined by nature, but virtue is voluntary, as the good man voluntarily takes the means to the end, in either case vice will be just as voluntary as virtue; for the bad man has free agency in his actions no less than the good man even if not in his selection of the end.

If then, as is commonly said, the virtues are voluntary, for we do in some way contribute to the formation of our habits, and

because we possess a certain character, we assume the end to be of a certain kind, the vices must be voluntary also, for all this applies equally to them.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
SEVENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VIII



ELL now, we have described in outline the nature of the virtues generally, and have shown that they are mean states, and that they are habits, and how they are formed, and that they show themselves in the performance of the same acts as produce them, and that they are in our own power and voluntary, and are regulated as right reason may direct.

But the particular actions and the habits are not voluntary in the same sense : for while we are masters of our actions from beginning to end, knowing the particular details : in the case of our habits, we are only masters of the beginning, their growth by gradual stages being imperceptible, like the growth of disease. But still they are voluntary, because it was in our power to act in one way or another.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
EIGHTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER IX



WE will resume then the consideration of the individual virtues, saying what they are, what their subjects are, and how they deal with them. In doing this, we shall at the same time ascertain how many there are.

First, then, let us treat of courage. That it is a mean state, with regard to fear and confidence, has been already said. It is clear that the objects of our fears are obviously things fearful, or to speak generally, evils; which accounts for the common definition of fear, as the expectation of evil.

Of course we fear evils of all kinds; as, for instance, disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death; yet with all these courage is not held to be concerned. For there are some things which it is right and noble to fear, and which it is base not to fear; disgrace, for example. He who fears disgrace is a good

man and has a sense of honour, and he who does not fear it is shameless. Yet a shameless person is called courageous, metaphorically, by some people, because he somewhat resembles the courageous man, who is in a sense devoid of fear. Poverty, perhaps, or disease, or indeed anything that is not the result of vice, and for which he is not responsible, a man ought not to fear. But still, to be fearless in regard to these things is not strictly courage; though the term is sometimes applied in virtue of a certain resemblance. There are men, for instance who, though cowardly in the dangers of war, are yet liberal, and bold enough to face loss of wealth.

Nor, on the other hand, is a man a coward if he fears insult to his wife or children, or if he fears envy, or any such thing; nor is he courageous if he is unmoved when about to be scourged.

With what kind of terrors then is the courageous man concerned? First of all, must they not be the greatest, for no man is more able to withstand what is dreadful. But nothing is so fearful as death, because it is

the end of all things, and the dead man is thought to be capable neither of good nor evil. Still it would seem, that the courageous man is not concerned with even death in every form, as with death by drowning, for example, or by disease. With what form of death then is he concerned? must it not be with death under the noblest conditions? and such is death in war, for war involves the greatest and noblest of all dangers. And this is confirmed by the honours awarded to courage in free states, and by kings.

A man then is called courageous in the proper sense of the term if he is fearless in facing a noble death, and in such sudden emergencies as involve death; and such conditions more especially arise in the course of war.

Not but that the courageous man will be fearless at sea and also in sickness, although not in the same way as the sailors; for the sailors are light-hearted and hopeful, by reason of their experience, when the landsmen though courageous are apt to give themselves up for lost, and shudder at the notion of such a death.

Moreover, men display courage in circumstances where prowess may be shown, and where death is noble, but in the forms of death just alluded to neither of these conditions are present.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
NINTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER X



ME^N do not all feel the same things to be fearful, and there are according to common parlance some things so fearful as to be beyond human endurance. Such things would of course be fearful to every man of sense, but things which are within the power of man to bear differ in magnitude and degree, and the same is true of such things as inspire confidence.

The courageous man is undismayed by danger, so far as a man can be; and although he will fear such things, he will stand up against them as he ought, and as reason may direct, for the sake of that which is noble, for this is the end of virtue.

But it is possible to fear these things too much, or too little, or again to fear things which are not really fearful as if they were so. And here a man sometimes errs when he fears

what he ought not to fear at all, or sometimes when he fears in the wrong manner, improper way, or at the wrong time, and so on : and so too with the things which inspire confidence. He then who endures and fears what he ought, from the right motive and in the right way, and at the right time, and likewise feels confidence, is courageous ; for the courageous man regulates both his feelings and his actions with due regard to the circumstances, as he ought, and as reason directs.

But the end in view of every action is the end which accords with the habit of which that act is a manifestation, and so to the courageous man, courage is a noble thing ; therefore the end or motive of courage is also noble, for the character of everything is determined by its end.

The courageous man, therefore, faces danger, and performs the acts of courage, for the sake of what is noble.

Of the characters that run to excess, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no appropriate name ; we have already observed that there are many states which have no name of their

own ; but a man would be a madman or insensible to all pain if he feared nothing, not even an earthquake, or breakers, as they tell of the Celts.

He, on the other hand, who is excessively confident in the presence of fearful things is called foolhardy. He is thought moreover to be a braggart, and to pretend to courage which he has not got. He wishes to appear to face fearful things as the courageous man faces them, and so imitates him in whatever points he can. For this reason most foolhardy men are usually cowards at heart ; for although they are over-confident when they can be so safely, yet they refuse to face real dangers.

The man whose fear is excessive is a coward, for he fears the wrong things, in the wrong way, and so on. He is deficient also in confidence, but he is most clearly detected by his excessive fear of pain ; he is a faint-hearted kind of man, for he fears all things. The courageous man is just the contrary, for confidence implies hopefulness.

Thus the coward, and the foolhardy, and the courageous man have to do with the same

things, namely, fear and confidence, but assume different attitudes towards them. The two first-mentioned exceed, or fall short, while the last is in the mean state, and as he ought to be. The foolhardy again are precipitate, and being eager before danger, when actually in the midst of it they are apt to fail, while the courageous are keen in action, but quiet and composed beforehand.

Courage, then, as has been said, is a mean state in respect to things that inspire confidence or fear, in such circumstances as have been described, and the courageous man chooses to face danger, either because to do so is noble, or because not to do so is base. But to seek death as an escape from poverty, or love, or anything that is simply painful, is the act, not of a courageous man, but of a coward. For to fly from trouble is mere effeminacy, and the suicide braves the terrors of death, not because it is noble, but in order to escape from some evil.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
TENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER XI



TRUE courage, then, is such as I have described it, but there are five other kinds of courage so called.

We will take first political or civil courage, which most resembles true courage. It is so called because the motives which are thought to actuate citizens in facing danger are the penalties and disgrace which the laws inflict, and the honours which they confer; this is thought to be the reason why those are the most courageous nations in which cowards are visited with disgrace, and the courageous held in honour.

This is the kind of courage Homer exhibits in his characters; Diomed and Hector, for example. The latter says, ‘Polydamas will be the first to heap reproach upon me.’ And so Diomed, ‘For Hector surely will hereafter say, speaking in Troy, Tydides by my hand’—

This courage most nearly resembles the

courage which has been already described, because it arises from virtue, that is, from a feeling of shame, and a desire of what is noble, that is, of honour, and an avoidance of reproach, which is disgraceful.

In the same class one would be inclined to place all those who show courage under compulsion from their commanders, but on a lower level, because they act thus from fear, not from shame, and what they seek to avoid is not disgrace but pain. Commanders do in fact compel their men sometimes, as Hector says, 'But whomsoever I shall find cowering afar from the fight, the teeth of dogs he shall by no means escape.'

And the same thing is done by commanders who order their men to stand, and who beat them if they give way, or draw them up in front of trenches, or other similar obstacles, for they all use compulsion.

But a man ought to be courageous, not under compulsion, but from a sense of honour.

In the second place, experience in particular things is thought to be a sort of courage ;

and hence it was that Socrates thought that courage was knowledge.

This sort of courage is exhibited of course by different men under different circumstances, but in warlike matters, with which we are now concerned, it is exhibited by the regular troops : for there are, it seems, many false alarms in war, and with these the regular troops are better acquainted ; so they appear to be courageous, because the other troops do not understand the real state of matters. Then again, by reason of their experience, they are better able to inflict wounds without suffering themselves, because they are skilled in the use of their weapons, and have such weapons as are most serviceable both with a view to offence and defence. In battle, then, they are like armed men fighting with unarmed, or trained athletes with amateurs, for in athletic contests also it is not the most courageous men who are the best fighters, but those who are strongest, and in the best condition.

In fact, the regular troops turn cowards, when the danger is too great for them, and when they are inferior in numbers and re-

sources; for then they are the first to fly, while the citizen-troops stand and die at their posts, as happened at the temple of Hermes. For in the eyes of these flight is disgraceful, and death preferable to safety gained at such a price; while the regulars originally met the danger under the notion of their own superiority, but on discovering their error they took to flight, having greater fear of death than of disgrace. But this is not the character of the courageous man.

Thirdly, the term courage is sometimes applied to rage. It is thought that those who act under the influence of passion, and like wild beasts turn on those who have wounded them are courageous, because in fact the truly courageous are full of spirit. For passion more than anything else incites men to danger. As Homer says, 'he put might into his spirit,' 'he roused his strength and spirit,' or again, 'keen was the wrath in his nostrils,' 'his blood boiled:' for all these seem to denote the stir and rush of rage.

Now they that are truly courageous act from a sense of honour, although passion co-operates

with them ; but wild beasts are moved by pain, that is, because they have been wounded, or are frightened, since if they are quietly in their own haunts, forest or marsh, they do not attack men. Surely they are not courageous, because they rush into danger when goaded on by pain and rage, without foreseeing the danger, else asses would be courageous when they are hungry, for though beaten they will not then leave off eating ; and adulterers do many bold actions by reason of their lust. We may conclude then that they who are goaded on to meet danger by pain and rage are not courageous. Yet this courage which arises from passion appears to be the most natural kind of courage, and would be courage of the true kind, if it could have added to it a right purpose and proper motive.

Men feel pain in anger, and take pleasure in revenge ; and when they fight for these reasons, they may fight well, but they are not courageous (for they do not act from a sense of honour nor as reason directs, but are driven by passion), still they bear some resemblance to the courageous man.

Nor again are sanguine men courageous, since their confidence in danger arises from their frequent victories over numerous foes. The two resemble one another, however, in that both are confident, but then the courageous are so for the reasons already named, whereas the sanguine are confident from a settled conviction in their own superiority, and because they think they will not suffer any thing in return. Men who are intoxicated behave in much the same way, for they become sanguine when in that state. But when the event disappoints their expectations, they run away. Whereas it is the character of the courageous man, as we saw, to face such things as are fearful to man, and present that appearance, because it is noble to do so, and disgraceful not to do so.

For this reason it is thought to be a proof of greater courage to be fearless and undismayed in sudden danger, than in danger that has been anticipated, because courage then comes rather from a fixed habit, or less from preparation. For where a man can foresee danger he might perhaps choose it after

calculation and reasoning, but towards sudden danger he will do so from habit.

Lastly, those who are ignorant of their danger appear to be courageous, and are not very far removed from sanguine people; but still they are inferior to them, inasmuch as they have no opinion of themselves, which the sanguine must have. Hence the sanguine stand their ground for a time, but the ignorant fly the moment they discover things are not what they supposed, as did the Argives when they fell upon the Lacedæmonians, mistaking them for Sicyonians.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
ELEVENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER XII



WE have now described the character of the courageous man, and of those who are thought to be courageous.

It must be remarked, however, that though courage is concerned both with confidence and fear, it is not equally concerned with both, having more to do with occasions of fear. For he who is undismayed and behaves as he ought in the presence of danger is better entitled to be called courageous, than he who behaves thus on the occasions which inspire confidence. So then men are termed courageous for enduring painful things.

Courage, therefore, involves pain, and is justly praised, for it is harder to endure pain than to abstain from pleasure.

I do not mean to say that the end of courage is not pleasant, but it is obscured by

the attendant circumstances, as happens also in gymnastic contests. Boxers, for instance, have a pleasant end in view, namely, the crown and the honours; but the blows they receive are painful and grievous to flesh and blood, and so are all the labours they have to undergo; and as these are many, while the object or prize is small, it appears to bring little pleasure.

If this then is the case with courage, death and wounds will be painful to the courageous man and against his will, but he endures them, because it is noble to do so, or because it is disgraceful not to do so. And the more he is endowed with every virtue and every happiness, the more grievous will death be to him; for to such a man life is of the highest value, and he knows that he is losing the greatest of goods by death, and this is painful. But he is no less courageous because he feels this pain, nay, rather we may say he is more courageous, because he chooses noble conduct in battle in preference to those good things. It follows then that pleasure does not accompany the exercise of all the virtues, except in so far as the end is attained.

But there is perhaps no reason why men of this character should make such good soldiers as those who are less courageous but have nothing to lose ; as these last are ready to face any danger, and will barter their lives for a small price.

Let this be accepted as sufficient on the subject of courage ; the true nature of which it is not difficult to gather, in outline at least, from what has been said.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
TWELFTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER XIII



HAVING treated of courage we will next consider temperance, for these two are the virtues of the irrational parts of our nature.

We have already said that temperance is a mean state in respect of pleasures; for it is not concerned with pains in the same degree or manner. It is in respect of pleasures also that intemperance manifests itself. Let us now try to determine what kind of pleasures these are.

Let pleasures then be understood to be divided into mental and bodily, instances of the former being the love of honour or the love of learning; for he who loves honour or learning takes pleasure in the object of which he is fond, although it is not his body which is affected, but rather his mind. But men are not called temperate or intemperate in respect of pleasures of this kind, nor in fact in re-

spect of any pleasures which are not bodily. For example, those who love to tell long stories, and are fond of talking, and who spend their days on trifles, we call gossips, but we do not call them intemperate, nor do we apply the term to those who are pained at the loss of money or friends.

Temperance then is concerned with bodily pleasures only, though not to all even of these. For those who take pleasure in gratifications of the sight, as colours, and forms, and painting, are not called either temperate or intemperate. Yet it would seem that one may take pleasure even in such objects as one ought, and more than one ought, and less than one ought. And so too with the sense of hearing; no one calls those intemperate who take an excessive pleasure in music or acting, or those temperate who take a proper pleasure in them.

Nor are these terms applied to those persons whose pleasure arises from the sense of smell, except incidentally. We do not say men are intemperate because they take pleasure in the scent of fruit, or flowers, or incense, but rather if they take pleasure in the smell of perfumes

and sauces ; for intemperate men take pleasure in these, because they are by them reminded of the objects of their desires. You may indeed see other men take pleasure in the smell of food when they are hungry, but to constantly take pleasure in such things is a mark of intemperance, for it is only to the intemperate man that these things are objects of desire.

Nor do even animals derive pleasure from these senses, except incidentally. I mean, it is not the scent of hares' flesh, which dogs take pleasure in, but the eating of it, perception of which pleasure is caused by the sense of smell. The lion delights not in the lowing of the ox, but in the devouring of him ; but as the lowing tells him the ox is near, the lion appears to take pleasure in the sound. In like manner, he has no pleasure in merely seeing or finding a stag or wild goat, but in the prospect of a meal.

Temperance and intemperance, then, are concerned with such pleasures as are shared in by the lower animals, for which reason they seem to be slavish and brutal ; they are the pleasures of the touch and of the taste.

With taste, however, they are concerned but little, if at all; for it is by taste that we distinguish flavours; as is done by those who test wines, or season made dishes.

But it is not this judgment of flavours that gives pleasure, at any rate to the intemperate, but the actual enjoyment of them, the medium of which is always the sense of touch, whether in eating or in drinking, or in grosser lusts. This accounts for the wish said to have been expressed once by a certain gourmand, 'that his throat had been formed longer than a crane's neck,' as though his pleasure was derived from the sense of touch.

The sense then with which intemperance is concerned is the most common of all the senses, and would seem to be justly a matter of reproach, since it exists in us not as men, but as animals. To take pleasure in such things, and to love them better than all others is brutish; for the most liberal of the pleasures of the touch must be excluded; those, for instance, which occur in the course of gymnastic training, from the rubbing and the warm bath, because the touch with which the intemperate

man is concerned does not extend over the whole body, but is confined to certain parts.

Now, of our desires some are thought to be universal, others to be individual and acquired; thus the desire for food is natural, for every one who feels want, desires meat or drink, or both; and, as Homer says, the man in the prime of youth needs and desires intercourse with the other sex. But every one does not desire a particular kind of food, nor the same kind. And therefore the conceiving of such desires appears to be peculiar to ourselves, or individual. It must be admitted, however, that there is something natural in it; because different things are pleasant to different men. There are some things which every one prefers. Now, in respect to the natural desires, few men go wrong, and when they do, it is always in one direction, that of excess. For to eat and drink whatever is put before you till you are filled to repletion, is to exceed the natural limit of quantity, for the natural desire is simply the satisfaction of a want.

Accordingly such men are called belly-mad,

because they fill themselves beyond all bounds, and it is only slavish people who acquire this character.

But in regard to those pleasures that are individual, many men go wrong and in many different ways; for those who are said to be 'fond of so and so' may go wrong in taking pleasure in wrong things, or taking pleasure excessively, or as the mass of men do, or in a wrong fashion, intemperate men exceed in all these ways. For they take pleasure in some things in which they ought not to do so, because they are detestable, and in such as it is right to take pleasure in, they do so more than they ought, and as the mass of men do.

We see then that excess in respect of pleasures is intemperance, and is a thing to be blamed. But in respect of pains, we find that a man is not, as in the case of courage, said to be temperate because he faces pains, or intemperate if he does not. But the intemperate man is so, because he is pained more than he ought to be at not obtaining things which are pleasant, and thus his pleasure is the cause of his pain, and the temperate man is such in

virtue of not being pained at the absence of pleasure, that is, by having to abstain from what is pleasant.

The intemperate man then desires all pleasant things, or those which are specially pleasant, and he is impelled by his desire to choose these things in preference to all others; and this involves pain, not only when he misses the attainment of his objects, but in the very desiring them, as all desire is attended by pain. Surely it is a strange case this, to be pained for the sake of pleasure.


Those who are defective on the side of pleasure, and take less pleasure in things than they ought, are seldom to be met with, for insensibility of this kind is not human. Even the lower animals distinguish between different kinds of food, and like some kinds, and dislike others. In fact, a being who took no pleasure in any thing, and to whom all things were alike, would be far from being a man at all; and there is no name for such a being, because he does not exist.

But the temperate man is moderate in all these things. He takes no pleasure in the

things which delight the vicious man, and in fact rather dislikes them, nor does he take pleasure at all in wrong things, nor excessively in the pleasures of touch and taste at all ; nor is he pained at their absence ; nor does he desire them ; or, if he does, only in moderation, and neither more than he ought, nor at wrong times, and so on. But such things as are conducive to health and good condition of body, being also pleasant, these he will desire moderately and as he ought to do, and also such other pleasant things provided they are not injurious or incompatible with what is noble, or disproportionate to his means ; for he that desires them then would be liking such pleasures more than is right ; whereas the temperate man regulates his desires by the dictates of right reason.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
THIRTEENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER XIV

NTEMPERANCE seems to be more voluntary than cowardice, because the former is due to pleasure and the latter to pain, and pleasure is a thing we choose, while pain is a thing we avoid. And pain upsets and destroys the natural disposition of the sufferer, whereas pleasure has no such effect, and is more voluntary, and therefore to give way to it is more justly open to reproach.

It is so also for the following reason ; that it is easier to train one's self to resist temptations to pleasure, because they frequently occur in life, and the training involves no risk ; whereas the case is the reverse as regards the objects of fear.

Again, it would seem that the habit of cowardice as a whole is more voluntary than are particular acts of cowardice, because cowardice in itself is painless, but in parti-

cular acts of cowardice, men are so beside themselves through fear of pain that they throw away their arms, and otherwise disgrace themselves, for which reason such acts are even thought by some to be compulsory.

But in the case of the intemperate man the particular acts are on the contrary quite voluntary, being done with desire and direct exertion of the will, but the general result is less voluntary, for no man desires to be intemperate.

The term intemperance or unchastened-ness we apply also to the faults of children, which have a certain resemblance to the faults of the intemperate. It matters not for our purpose which of the two is named after the other; but it is clear that the later is named after the earlier. And the metaphor seems to be a very good one; for that which inclines towards base things, and is capable of rapid growth, ought to be chastened. And these characteristics are more strongly marked in children and in the appetites than in anything else. For children live by impulse and appetite, and the longing for pleasure is most pronounced in them.

Unless then this element is obedient and subject to the governing principle, it will go to great lengths. For in the fool the longing for pleasure is insatiable and indiscriminating, and every gratification of the desire increases the natural tendency, until the desires becoming great and violent they even expel reason entirely. Therefore they ought to be moderate and few, and in no respect contrary to reason. Now, when the appetite is in such a state, we denominate it obedient and chastened.

For as a child ought to live with constant regard to the orders of his tutor, so should the appetites be subject to reason.

And so the appetites of the temperate man must be in accordance with reason. For the aim of both is that which is noble ; that is to say, the temperate man desires the right things in the right manner and at the right time, which is exactly what reason directs. Let this then be taken as an account of temperance.

BOOK IV

CHAPTER I



WE will next speak of liberality. Now this seems to be the mean state in regard to property. For the liberal man wins praise, not in war, nor in those circumstances in which temperance is commended, nor again in respect of his judgments, but in regard to the giving and taking of property, and especially with regard to giving. By property we mean all those things whose value is measured by money.

Now the states of excess and defect in regard to property are respectively prodigality and illiberality. We invariably apply the term illiberality to those who are over-careful about property, but to denote a combination of vices we sometimes apply the term prodigality. We call those in-

temperate people who squander their money in riotous living, prodigals. Prodigals therefore are thought to be very worthless people, as they combine a number of vices.

It must be noted, however, that this is not a strict and proper use of the term prodigal, since its etymological meaning is to denote a man who has one particular vice, namely, that of wasting his substance, for he is destroyed through his own fault; and this he really may be said to be, for the wasting of his substance is thought to be a kind of wasting of himself, since these things are the means of living. It is in this sense then that we understand the term prodigality.

Whatever things are for use may be used well or ill, and riches belong to this class. He uses each particular thing best who has the virtue that is concerned with that thing; so that he will make the best use of riches who has the virtue that is concerned with property, that is to say, the liberal man.

Spending and giving are thought to be

the using of money, while taking and keeping seem to be forms of its acquisition. And so it is more the part of the liberal man to give to the right people than to take from the right quarter, and not to take from the wrong quarter. For it is more distinctive of virtue to do good than to receive good, and to do what is noble than to forbear from doing what is disgraceful. But it is plain that doing good and acting nobly, are implied in the act of giving, while receiving good, and forbearing to do what is disgraceful, are implied in the act of taking.

Thanks, too, are given to him who gives, not to him who does not take, and praise even more. Again, it is easier not to take than to give, for we are far more disposed to abstain from taking what belongs to somebody else, than to give up what is our own.

And again, it is those who give that are called liberal, while those who abstain from taking are not praised for liberality so much as for justice, while those who take are not praised at all.

And, of all virtuous characters liberal people seem to be most beloved, because they are useful to others, and their usefulness consists in their giving.

All virtuous actions are noble, and are done for the sake of that which is noble. And so the liberal man will give from a noble motive, and will give rightly; that is, he will give the right amount to the right persons at the right times, and his giving will have all the other qualifications of right giving; and he will do all this too with pleasure, or at least without pain, for a virtuous action is pleasant, or at least not unpleasant; it most certainly is not painful.

But the man who gives to the wrong people, or not from a noble motive, but for some other cause, will not be called liberal, but by some other name. Nor will he be so called who gives with pain; this being a sign that he would prefer his wealth to the noble action, and this is not the character of the liberal man. Nor will the liberal man take from wrong sources, for such taking is not characteristic of one who does

not value wealth; nor again will he be apt to ask a favour, for he who confers benefits on others is not usually ready to receive them. But from right and proper sources, his own property, for instance, he will take, not as if it is noble to do so, but because it is necessary, in order that he may have the wherewithal to give. Neither will he neglect his own property, since it is his wish by means of it to help others. He will refrain from making indiscriminate gifts, in order that he may have wherewithal to give to the right persons, at the right times, and where it is noble so to do.

Again, it is characteristic of the liberal man to even go to excess in giving, so as to leave too little for himself, for disregard of self is characteristic of the liberal man.

But a man's liberality must always be considered in relation to his means, for liberality depends not on the amount of what is given, but on the moral state of the giver which proportions the gift to his means. And thus it is quite possible that the giver of the smaller amount may

be the more liberal man, if his means are smaller.

Again, those who have inherited a fortune seem to be more liberal than those who have made one; for, in the first place, they have never experienced want, and next, people always love their own works most, just as parents do, and poets.

It is not easy for a liberal man to be rich, since he is not apt to take or to keep, but to lavish, and values wealth not for its own sake, but only with a view to giving it away. Hence the charge is often made against fortune, that they who most deserve to be rich are least so. Yet this is natural enough, for it is impossible to have wealth or anything else without taking the trouble to acquire it.

Yet the liberal man will not give to the wrong people, nor at the wrong times, and so on; for he would not then be acting in accordance with liberality, and if he spent money upon such objects, he would have nothing to spend upon the right objects. For, as we have said before, he is liberal

who spends in proportion to his means, and on proper objects, while he who does so in excess is prodigal; this is the reason why we never call despots prodigal, because it does not seem to be easy for them by their gifts and expenditure to exceed the measure of their possessions.

Liberality, then, is a mean state in regard to the giving and taking of wealth; the liberal man will give and spend the right amount on the right objects, in great things and in small alike, and will take pleasure in doing so. He will also take the right amount from the right sources; for, as the virtue is a mean state in regard to both giving and taking, he will do both as he ought. Right giving is naturally attended by right taking, whereas any other kind of taking is incompatible with it. Thus the givings and takings which are consistent with one another are found together in the same person, but those which are incompatible clearly are not.

But if the liberal man should happen to spend money in a manner which is neither

right nor noble, he will be pained, but only moderately, and as he ought; for virtue naturally feels pleasure and pain at the right things, and in the right manner.

Again, the liberal man is easy to deal with in money matters; for he can easily be cheated, as he does not value wealth, and is more vexed with himself if he has failed to spend where he ought, than pained if he has chanced to spend where he ought not, and he does not approve the maxims of Simonides.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FIRST CHAPTER

CHAPTER II



THE prodigal man, on the other hand, goes wrong in these respects also, for he neither feels pleasure and pain at the right things nor in the right manner, and this will become clearer as we proceed.

We have said already that prodigality and illiberality are respectively states of excess and defect, and this in two things, giving and taking; expenditure of course being included in giving. Prodigality exceeds in giving and in abstaining from taking, but is deficient in taking; while illiberality is deficient in giving, and exceeds in taking, but always in small matters.

Now the two elements of prodigality are not commonly found in conjunction; it is not easy for a man to give to everyone, and take from no one, for private persons, if they give in this way, soon find their

means run short, and it is persons of this kind who are generally called prodigal. For he that should combine both elements would seem to be far superior to the illiberal man; in that he may be easily cured, both by advancing years, and also by the want of means, and he may thus attain to the mean or intermediate state. He has, indeed, already the chief characteristics of the liberal man, he gives and abstains from taking, only he does neither in the right manner nor well. If therefore he could be rightly trained, or his character changed in any other way, he would be a liberal man, for then he will give to those to whom he should, and will not take whence he ought not. And so it seems that he is not a bad character, for to exceed in giving and in abstaining from taking, is no sign of a vicious or ignoble nature, but a foolish one.

A prodigal of this kind then seems to be far superior to the illiberal man, both for the reasons named, and also because the former does good to many persons; but the latter to no one, not even to himself. But

most prodigals, as has been said, not only give to the wrong people but take from the wrong sources, and so in this respect are illiberal. They become grasping, because they wish to spend, and are not able to do so easily, since their means soon run short, and they are then obliged to get the means from other sources. At the same time, since they care not for what is noble, they take heedlessly from any source whatever, for they desire to give, and care not how they give or whence they get the means of giving.

And for this reason their gifts are not liberal, inasmuch as they are not noble, nor are they given with a view to what is noble, nor in the right manner. These prodigals oftentimes enrich those who ought to be poor, and will give nothing to persons of fair character, but to flatterers, or those who provide them in any way with pleasure, they will give much. And therefore most of them are also intemperate; for being open-handed, they squander their money upon the unrestrained gratifications of their passions, and as nobleness is not the rule of

their lives, they fall away into the pursuit of pleasure.

The prodigal, then, if left unguided, commits these faults ; but if he be carefully trained, he may come to the mean and right state.

But illiberality is incurable ; for old age, and incapacity of any kind, seems to make people illiberal. It is also more congenial to human nature than prodigality, for most people are more fond of accumulating money than of giving it away. It is of wide range too, and has many forms, for there seem to be many ways in which people can be illiberal. For as it consists of two things, deficiency in giving and excess of taking, it is not always found in its entirety, but it sometimes happens that the parts are divided, and some persons exceed in taking, while others fall short in giving. Those, for instance, who are called by such names as thrifty, close-fisted, niggardly, are all deficient in giving, but they neither covet nor wish to take other men's property ; in some instances they are influenced by a sense of honesty, or desire to avoid disgrace.

CHAPTER III



IT would seem natural to discuss magnificence next, for this also seems to be a virtue that has to do with wealth. But it does not, like liberality, extend to all transactions concerned with money, but only applies to such as involve a large expenditure, and in these it exceeds liberality in amount, for, as its very name suggests, magnificence is suitable expenditure on a large scale. But the largeness is of course relative; the expenditure that is suitable for a man who equips a trireme is not the same as that which is suitable for the leader of a sacred embassy. What is suitable, then, is relative to the individual, and the occasion and object. But he who spends what is fitting upon small or ordinary occasions is not called magnificent; as in the words of the poet,

‘ Oft to the wandering beggar did I give,’

but he who spends what is fitting on great occasions, for the magnificent man is liberal, but it does not follow that every liberal man is magnificent. The deficiency of such a state is called meanness, the excess of it, vulgarity, bad taste, and so on; the excess is brought about, not by an excessive expenditure on proper objects, but by making a show on improper occasions and in an improper way: of these we will speak presently. The magnificent man is like a skilled artist, because he can see what is suitable, and can spend large sums with good taste; for, as we said at the outset, a confirmed habit is determined by the acts and the objects with which it is concerned.

The expenses of the magnificent man, therefore, are great and suitable: such also are the results of his expenditure, for only thus will the greatness of the expense be befitting to the result. The work then must be proportionate to the expense, and the expense proportionate to the result, or even greater; and the magnificent man will incur such expenses from a noble motive, this being

the common characteristic of all the virtues, and further, he will spend with pleasure and lavishly; for a minute calculation of expense is mean. He will consider also how a thing may be done most beautifully and suitably, rather than for how much it may be done, and how it can be done with the least expense.

So the magnificent man must be also a liberal man, for the liberal man will also spend the right amount in the right manner; but it is the greatness, that is to say, the large scale, which is characteristic of the magnificent man, the sphere of action of liberality and magnificence being the same, without spending more money than another man, he will produce a more magnificent result. For, the excellence of a possession is not the same as the excellence of a result or work of art, as a possession, that is most valuable which is worth most, gold for instance; as a work of art, that which is great and beautiful, for the contemplation of such work excites admiration, and what is magnificent is always admirable. Indeed, magnificence is excellence

of work on a large scale. There is a kind of expenditure which we call honourable, such as dedicatory offerings to the gods, and the furnishing of their temples, and sacrifices, and similarly everything that relates to divine worship, and all such public matters as are prompted by a noble ambition, as when men think that it is their duty to furnish a chorus for the stage, or fit out and maintain a trireme, or give a public feast in a handsome style.

But in all these cases, as has been already stated, we must have a regard to the rank, and means of the man who spends, for the expenditure should be proportionate to the circumstances and suitable not only to the result, but to its author. It follows that a poor man cannot be magnificent, as he has not the means to spend large sums of money suitably; and if he attempts it he is a fool, as his expenditure will be out of proportion to his means, and contrary to propriety, whereas a thing must be done in the right way to be virtuous.

But such expenditure is fitting in those who have got the necessary means, either by

their own efforts, or through their ancestors, or connections, and to those persons who have birth and reputation and the like; for all these things confer a certain greatness and importance.

The magnificent man then is properly a man of this character, and magnificence manifests itself most properly in expenditure of this kind, as we have said: for this is the greatest and most honourable kind of expenditure. But it may also be displayed on such private occasions as occur once in a lifetime, as, for instance, marriage, and the like, or on any occasion of interest to the general community, or to the governing classes, or in receiving strangers and sending them on their way, or in giving and returning them presents, for the magnificent man does not spend money on himself, but on public objects, and such gifts bear a certain resemblance to offerings to the gods.

But a magnificent man will furnish his house too in a style suitable to his wealth, for this also in a way reflects credit; and he will spend his money rather upon such

works as are permanent, for these are the most noble. And in all these cases he will observe the law of propriety, for the same things are not suitable to gods and to men, or in building a temple and a tomb. And again, every expenditure will be great of its kind, great expenditure on a great occasion being the most magnificent, and next to that, that which is great for the particular occasion whatever it may be.

There is a difference too between greatness in the result and greatness in the expenditure ; for instance, the most beautiful ball or bottle that is to be had is magnificent as a present to a child, though the price of it is small and paltry. It is characteristic then of the magnificent man to do magnificently whatever he does ; for the result so produced cannot easily be surpassed, and bears a proper proportion to the expenditure made upon it.

Such then is the magnificent man.

The man who exceeds, and is vulgarly profuse, exceeds in spending improperly, as has been said ; for he spends large sums upon trifles and makes a display in bad taste, as

for instance by giving the members of his club a feast fit for a wedding-party, or if he has to furnish a chorus for a comedy, by giving the actors purple to wear in the first scene, as did the Megarians. And all such things he will do, not from a noble motive, but merely to display his wealth, and because he thinks it will win him admiration; and he will spend little where he ought to spend much, and much where he should spend little.

But the mean man will be deficient on every occasion, and even in cases where he has spent very large sums, he will spoil the whole effect for want of some trifle; never doing anything without hesitating about it, and contriving how he can spend the least over it, and bemoaning even that, and imagining that he is doing everything on a greater scale than is necessary.

Both these states are vices, then, namely, vulgarity and meanness, but they do not incur reproach, because they are neither injurious to others, nor very unseemly in themselves.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
THIRD CHAPTER

CHAPTER IV



HIGHMINDEDNESS, as its very name would seem to show, is concerned with high and great matters; and we will first determine what these are. It makes no difference of course, whether we consider the moral state itself, or the person in whom it is exemplified.

Well then, he is thought to be highminded, who thinks himself worthy of high things, and who is worthy of them; for he who does so without being worthy is foolish, and no virtuous person is foolish or silly. The man we have described, then, is highminded. The man who thinks himself worthy of small things and is worthy of them, is modest or temperate, but not highminded; for since highmindedness implies greatness, just as beauty implies stature, small people may be neat and well proportioned, but not beautiful.

He who thinks himself worthy of high things and is unworthy of them is vain or conceited, although it is not everyone who thinks more highly of himself than he ought, that is a conceited person. He who values himself below his real worth is small-minded, whether that worth is great, moderate, or small, so long as his own estimate falls below it. This fault would seem to be greatest in one who is worthy of high things; for what would he do if his deserts were less than they are?

The highminded man, then, while in one sense in the extreme, namely, in the amount of his self-appreciation, is in the mean in point of propriety, for he estimates himself at his true worth, whereas the other two characters are in excess or defect. If, therefore, he thinks himself worthy of high things, and especially of the highest, there must be some one thing with which he will be especially concerned. Desert is a term used in reference to external goods; and of these we should assume that to be the greatest which we attribute to the gods, and which persons of high reputation most desire, and which is the prize awarded to the

noblest actions. But honour answers to this description, as being the greatest of external goods. The highminded man, then, bears himself as he ought in respect of honour and dishonour. In fact, it needs no proof that highminded men are concerned with honour; for it is honour, that they consider themselves specially worthy of, for it is according to their desert.

The small-minded man under-estimates himself, both as regards his own deserts, and also as regards the deserts of the highminded man. The vain or conceited man over-estimates his own deserts, though he does not estimate his deserts more highly than the highminded man. But the highminded man, as being worthy of the highest things, must be of the highest excellence, for the better man is always worthy of the greater things, and the best man of the highest things. It follows then, that the truly highminded man must be good. And indeed it would seem that the highminded man possesses whatever is great in every virtue. It would be inconsistent with the character of the highminded man to run

away wringing his hands, or to commit injustice; for what object will he have in doing a disgraceful action, if nothing is great in his eyes? in short, if we were to go into particulars, the notion of a highminded man that is not a good man would appear absurd. If he were not good, he would not be worthy of honour at all, for honour is the prize of virtue, and is only given to the good.

Highmindedness, then, seems to be a kind of crowning glory of the virtues, it makes them greater, and cannot exist without them; and for this reason it is a hard matter to be truly highminded, for it is impossible to be so without thorough goodness and nobleness of character.

The highminded man, then, is especially concerned with honour and dishonour, and at great honour from good men, he will be moderately pleased, as getting nothing more than his due, or perhaps even less, for no honour can be quite adequate to perfect virtue; but still he will accept it, as they have nothing greater to offer him. But such honour as is paid by ordinary people and on trifling

grounds he will utterly despise, for that is not what he deserves; and dishonour likewise he will despise, for in his case there cannot be just ground for it.

It is with honour, then, as has already been said, that the highminded man is specially concerned. Not but that with regard to wealth and power, and good or bad fortune of every kind, he will bear himself with moderation, however it may occur, and neither in prosperity will he be overjoyed, nor in adversity will he be unduly cast down. For he does not even bear himself towards honour as if it were the greatest of all goods. For power and wealth are desirable for the honour which they bring: at all events those who possess them wish to gain honour by their means. Now he who regards honour as a trifle will regard all other things in the same light: and this is the reason why highminded men are thought to be supercilious.

It seems, too, that the gifts of fortune contribute to form this character of highmindedness. For those who are nobly born, or men of influence, or wealth, are considered

to be entitled to honour, as they are in a position of superiority, and that which is superior in any good is always held in greater honour. And so these circumstances make men more highminded, for they receive honour at the hands of some men.

But really and truly it is only the good man who is worthy of honour; though if a man has both goodness and good fortune, he is thought to be more worthy of honour. Those, however, who have these good things, without also having virtue, are not justified in considering themselves worthy of great things, nor are they rightly to be called highminded, for perfect virtue is one of the indispensable conditions to such a character.

Those, then, who have these good things become supercilious and insolent, for without virtue it is not easy to bear the gifts of fortune becomingly; and so, being unable to bear them, and imagining themselves to be superior to everybody else, such people look down upon others, and do just whatever their fancy prompts; for they imitate the highminded man, without being really like him, and they

imitate him in such points as they can, that is to say, they do not perform virtuous actions, but they look down upon others. Whereas the highminded man despises others on good grounds, for he forms a true estimate of them, but most men do so upon insufficient grounds.

The highminded man is not fond of encountering small dangers, nor does he court danger at all, since there are but few things that he much values; but he will readily encounter great dangers, and upon such an occasion he is reckless of his life, knowing that there are terms on which it is not worth his while to live. He is ready to confer benefits, but is ashamed to receive them, for the former is the part of a superior, the latter of an inferior; accordingly he will greatly overpay any kindness done to him, because the original benefactor will thus become his debtor, and be in the position of a recipient of his favour. Such men seem likewise to remember those upon whom they have conferred benefits, but not those from whom they have received them; for the recipient of a benefit is inferior to the benefactor, and the high-

minded man wishes to be in the position of a superior; accordingly he is pleased to hear of the benefits which he has conferred, but not of those which he has received. And this is the reason why, in Homer, Thetis does not mention to Jupiter the services she had rendered him, and why the Lacedæmonians in treating with the Athenians, reminded them of the benefits which they had received.

It is characteristic, too, of the highminded man not to ask a favour at all, or only very reluctantly, but to do a service very readily; and to bear himself loftily towards the great or fortunate, but affably towards people of middle station; for it is a difficult and dignified thing to assert superiority over the former, but easy to assert it over the latter; and to be high and mighty in dealing with the former is not ignoble, but to be so towards those of humble station would be low and vulgar, as it is like showing off strength upon the weak.

He will not seek honour but let it come to him, and therefore he will not be eager to deprive others of their pre-eminence; and so he appears to be remiss and dilatory, except

where there is some great honour to be won or some great work to be achieved. He is concerned with but few things, but those few, great and notable. He will also be open, both in his likes and dislikes, for secrecy is an indication of fear. He will care for reality more than for appearance, and speak and act openly, for his contempt for others makes him a bold man, for which reason he is apt to speak the truth, except where he is ironical, but to the multitude he will be ironical.

He will be unable to fashion his life to suit another except he be a friend; for that is servile; that is the reason why all flatterers are of a slavish nature and men of low natures are flatterers. Nor, again, is his admiration easily excited, because nothing is great in his eyes; nor does he bear malice, for it is not the part of a highminded man to dwell on the past, especially on past injuries, but rather to overlook them. He does not talk about people, in fact, he will neither talk about himself, nor about others, for he does not care to be praised himself, or to have others blamed; while on the other hand he will not

be fond of praising others, and so he is not apt to speak ill of others even of his enemies, unless he means to give offence.

And he is by no means apt to make laments or requests about things which are necessary or trivial, for to do so is to attach great importance to them. He is the kind of man who would rather possess what is beautiful and unprofitable than what is useful and profitable; for this is characteristic of an independent man.

The highminded man, too, will be slow in his movements, his voice will be deep, and his speech deliberate, for it is not likely that a man will be in a hurry when there are few things in which he is interested, or excited when he regards nothing as very important, and these are the causes which make people speak in shrill tones and use rapid movements.

CHAPTER V



HIS then is the character of the highminded man; and he who is deficient is called small-minded, he who exceeds, vain or conceited.

However, as we observed in respect of the last character we discussed, these extremes are not thought to be vicious exactly, but only mistaken, for they do no actual harm.

The small-minded man, for instance, being really worthy of good things, deprives himself of the things of which he is worthy, and seems to some extent to be in fault, in not having a sufficiently high estimate of his own worth, and to be deficient in self-knowledge; as otherwise he would have aimed at what he is really worth, seeing that it is good. But yet such men are not thought to be fools, but rather diffident. And the opinion which they have of themselves, seems to have a deteriorating effect upon their character, for our aims

depend upon our estimate of our own deserts, and thus these men, under a notion of their own unworthiness, are deterred from noble actions and pursuits, and similarly from all external goods.

But vain men are fools and ignorant of themselves, and that palpably; for they undertake honourable offices as though they were worthy, and then they are detected. They also dress in fine clothes and give themselves airs, and so on, and wish that their good fortune may be known to all the world, and talk about themselves, expecting by these means to receive honour. Small-mindedness is more opposed to highmindedness than vanity is, for it is a more common and worse defect.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FIFTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VI

HIGHMINDEDNESS, then, has to do with honour on a large scale, as we have said. But there seems to be another virtue which has to do with honour, as was said at the outset. It would seem to bear the same relation to highmindedness that liberality does to magnificence; that is, both these virtues are not concerned with great things, but cause us to bear ourselves properly in moderate and small matters. Just as in the giving and taking of money there is a mean state, an excess, and a deficiency; so also in the desire for honour, there is more or less than is right, and a right source, and a right way.

We blame the ambitious man for desiring honour more than he ought, and for desiring to obtain it from wrong sources, and the unambitious man for not choosing to be honoured even for noble deeds. But some-

times we praise the ambitious man as being manly, and fond of noble things, and the unambitious man as being moderate and temperate, as we said at the beginning.

It is clear then that there are various senses in which a man is said to be fond of a thing, and that the term fond of honour is not always used in the same sense; but when we use it as a term of praise, we mean fonder than most men, and when as a term of censure, we mean fonder than is right.

And the mean state having no proper name, it seems that both extremes lay claim to it as if it were unoccupied ground; but of course where there is excess and deficiency, there must also be a mean. And in point of fact, men do desire honour more than they should, and less, and sometimes just as they ought; for instance, this state is praised, being a mean state with regard to honour, though without any recognised name. Compared with ambition, it seems to be lack of ambition, compared with lack of ambition, it seems to be ambition, compared with both, it seems in a way to be both at once. It seems that

this is the case with other virtues as well, but in this case it is the extreme characters which appear to be opposed to each other, because the mean state has no recognised name.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
SIXTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VII



GENTLENESS is a mean state with regard to anger, but there is no recognised name for the mean, and we may almost say the same of the extremes, so we apply the term gentleness to the mean, though it inclines rather to the deficiency, which has no recognised name.

The excess may be called wrathfulness, for the emotion underlying it is anger, though the causes which produce it are many and various. He, then, who is angry on the right occasions, and with the right persons, and also in the right manner, at the right times, and for the right length of time, is praised, we will call him gentle, since gentleness is used as a term of praise. For the man who is termed gentle, ought to be of unruffled temper and not carried away by his emotions, being angry only in such manner, and on such occasions, and for so long

a time, as reason prescribes. But he seems to err rather on the side of deficiency, for he is not apt to take revenge, but rather to make allowances and forgive. The deficiency, call it want of anger, or what you will, is blamed, for those who are not angry at things at which they ought to be angry, seem to be foolish, and so do those who are not angry in the right manner, or at the right time, or with those with whom they ought to be; for a man who labours under this deficiency seems to have no perception, or sense of pain, and, as he is never angered, to be incapable of defending himself. But to submit to be insulted, or patiently see one's own friends insulted, shows a slavish nature.

As for the excess, it occurs in all forms; men are angry with those with whom they ought not to be, and at things at which they ought not to be, and too hastily, and for too great a length of time. I do not mean, however, that all these faults are combined in the same person: that would in fact be impossible, for evil destroys itself, and if it appears in its entirety, it becomes unbearable.

The passionate then are soon angry, and with the wrong people, and on the wrong occasions, and more than they ought, but they soon cool again, which is the best point about them. The reason is that they do not control their anger; but, owing to their quickness of temper, they at once retaliate and then have done with it.

The choleric again are excessively quick-tempered, and are angry at every thing, and on every occasion; hence their name.

The sulky are hard to reconcile, and keep their anger for a long while, because they repress the feeling.

For as soon as we retaliate, we are relieved; for vengeance makes us cease from anger by producing pleasure in lieu of pain. But if this does not happen, the burden remains on our minds; for, as it does not show itself, no one attempts to reason it away, and to digest one's anger within one's self takes time.

Such men are very great nuisances to themselves and to their best friends.

We call those harsh or stern who are angry on the wrong occasions, and more than is

right, and for too long a time, and who will not be appeased without vengeance, or punishment.

Of the two extremes, it is the excess rather than the deficiency that is more opposed to gentleness, for it is of more common occurrence, as it is more natural to take vengeance than to forego it; and harsh or stern people are worse to live with than they who are too submissive.

Now from what has been here said, that is also plain which was said before. I mean, it is no easy matter to define how, and with what persons, and at what kind of things, and how long one ought to be angry, and up to what point a person is right or is wrong. For he that errs slightly from the right course, whether on the side of excess or deficiency, is not blamed; for sometimes we praise those who are deficient, and call them gentle, sometimes we call the harsh or stern manly, as being well qualified to govern. So it is not easy to lay down, in so many words, for what amount or kind of error a man is blamable; for it depends upon the particular circumstances

and must be decided by immediate perception. This much, however, is clear, that the mean state is praiseworthy, that is, the state in which we are angry with the right persons, and on the right occasions, and in the right manner, and so on; while the excesses and deficiencies are blamable, and if they occur to a small extent slightly so, if to a further extent more so, and if to a great extent very much so.

It is clear, therefore, that it is the mean state we are to hold to.

This then is to be taken as our account of the various moral states which have to do with anger.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
SEVENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VIII



EXT, as regards social intercourse, and interchange of words and acts, there are some men who are thought to be obsequious, who, with a view solely to giving pleasure, agree to everything, and never oppose, but think their line is to give no pain to those whom they meet. Those, on the other hand, are called cross and contentious who take exactly the contrary line, and object to everything, and have no care at all whether they give pain or not.

It is quite clear, of course, that the states of mind thus described are blamable, and that the mean between them is praiseworthy, in virtue of which a man will acquiesce in what he ought and in the right manner, and likewise will decline to acquiesce. This state has no special name assigned to it, but it most nearly resembles friendliness; for the man

who exhibits it answers to our idea of a good friend, except that then affection is also implied. This differs from friendliness in that it does not imply any feeling or strong affection for those with whom we associate; for he who has this quality acquiesces when he ought, not from any feeling of love or hate, but simply because that is his character. He will so act alike to those whom he knows and to those whom he does not know, to those with whom he is intimate and to those with whom he is not intimate; only that in each case he will act as suits the particular occasion, for it is not natural to show the same regard to strangers as to intimates, or to take the same care not to pain them.

It has been stated in a general way, that such a person will behave as he ought in his intercourse with others, and his aim will be to avoid giving pain and to contribute to pleasure, but he will always be guided by reference to what is noble and expedient.

For it seems that he has to do with the pleasures and pains which arise out of social intercourse. Whenever, then, it is not honour-

able, or is positively hurtful to him to contribute to any of these pleasures, he will refuse to acquiesce and prefer to give pain; or if a thing involves discredit, and considerable discredit, or any harm to its author, while his opposition will give some little pain, he will not acquiesce, but will raise an objection to it.

He will behave differently according as he is in the company of great men or ordinary men, and according to his degree of acquaintance with them; and so on, as other differences may occur, giving to each his due; preferring, apart from other considerations, to give pleasure, and loth to give pain, but still guided by a consideration of the consequences, according as they may preponderate, or in other words keeping what is noble and expedient steadily in view.

And thus he will inflict trifling pain for the sake of great subsequent pleasure.

The man who observes the mean then, is such as I have described him, but he has no recognised name. Of those who try to give pleasure, the man who simply and disin-

terestedly aims at pleasing is called obsequious, but he who does so with a view to secure some profit in the way of wealth, or those things which wealth may procure, is a flatterer. But the man who opposes every thing is, as we have already said, cross and contentious. Here the extremes have the appearance of being opposed to one another instead of to the mean, because the mean state has no recognised name.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
EIGHTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER IX



THE mean state with regard to boastfulness is concerned with much the same object-matter as the virtue just discussed, and, like it, has no name. But it may be as well to examine these states; for we shall better understand the subject of moral character after we have gone into the details, and shall be convinced that the virtues are mean states, by seeing that this is universally the case.

Those people who in the intercourse of daily life make it their object to give pleasure or pain have been already described; and we will now speak of those who are either truthful or untruthful in what they say and do, or in the pretensions which they advance.

The boaster seems to be fond of pretending to possess qualities usually held in esteem, although he does not possess them at all, or not to such extent as he pretends. The

ironical man, on the contrary, denies the merits which he really possesses, or else depreciates them, while he who observes the mean, being a straightforward kind of person, is truthful both in life and speech, admitting the facts about himself, and neither exaggerating nor disparaging them.

It is possible of course to pursue each of these lines of conduct either with or without an ulterior object; but every man speaks, and acts, and lives, according to his particular character and disposition, unless he has an ulterior object in view.

Falsehood in itself is base and blamable, truth is noble and praiseworthy, so it follows that the truthful man, who observes the mean in these matters is praiseworthy, while the two characters who habitually depart from the truth, are both blamable, but especially the boaster.

We will now speak of each of them, and first of the truthful man. We are not now speaking of the man who is truthful in his agreements, or in all such matters as come within the scope of justice or injustice, for

these matters would belong to another virtue, but rather of the man who in cases where no such important issues are at stake is truthful both in life and in word, simply because his moral state is truthful.

Such a man must be judged to be a good man; for he who loves truth for its own sake and is truthful in unimportant matters, will be all the more truthful in matters that are important; for surely he will have a dread of falsehood as a base thing, seeing that he shunned it even in itself, apart from its consequences: and he that is of such a character is praiseworthy. He inclines rather towards understatement of the truth, this having an appearance of being in better taste than an overstatement, for all exaggeration is odious.

He, on the other hand, who pretends to greater things than he possesses, with no ulterior motive, seems to be a bad man, as otherwise he would not take pleasure in falsehood, but he looks more like a fool than a knave. But supposing he has an ulterior object, if that object be honour or glory, as in the case of the boaster, then he is not so very blame-

worthy, but if it be, directly or indirectly, for pecuniary considerations, his conduct is more discreditable.

A man is a boaster by virtue of his moral state, and because it is his character to be such; just as there are liars who take pleasure in falsehood for its own sake, while others lie from a desire of glory or gain. Those who boast with a view to reputation, pretend to such qualities as attract praise or congratulation; those whose motive is gain, pretend to such qualities as may be of use to their neighbours and the absence of which can be concealed, as for instance, to skill in magic or medicine. And accordingly most boasters pretend to such qualities as these, and boast of them, for the conditions we have mentioned are realised in them.

Ironical people, on the other hand, who depreciate their own qualities, appear to be of a more refined character, for it seems that their object is not to make gain, but to avoid pomposity; one very common trait in such characters is their denying common current opinions, as Socrates used to do. People who

lay claim to such things as are trivial and obvious, are called humbugs, and are simply despicable.

This self-depreciation sometimes appears to be boastfulness, as in the excessive plainness of dress affected by the Lacedæmonians; for both excess and exaggerated deficiency partake of the nature of boastfulness. But they who employ irony in moderation, and in matters that are not too obvious and palpable, give an impression of refinement. The boaster appears to be the opposite of the truthful man, for he is worse than the ironical man.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
NINTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER X



SINCE relaxation is an element in life, and one form of relaxation is witty conversation, it seems that in this respect also there is a kind of intercourse which is in good taste ; there are things that it is right to say, and a right way of saying them ; and the same with listening, and it will make a difference what kind of people they are to whom one speaks or listens. It is plain that in regard to these matters also it is possible to go beyond, or to fall short of the mean.

Now they who exceed the proper limit in ridicule, seem to be buffoons and vulgar persons, who will have their fun at any cost, and who aim rather at raising a laugh than at saying what is seemly, and at avoiding to pain the object of their wit. They, on the other hand, who would not for the world make a joke themselves, and are displeased with such

as do, are considered boorish and austere. But those who jest in good taste, are called witty or quick-witted, for it would seem that a man's character is revealed in these playful movements; and as bodies are judged by their movements, so too are moral characters.

But as the ridiculous lies on the surface, and the majority of men have an excessive fondness for amusement and jesting, the buffoon, too, is often described as witty, because he gives pleasure; but it is plain from what has been said that there is a difference, and, indeed, a considerable difference, between the two.

The characteristic which belongs to the mean state is tact. A man of tact will only say and listen to such things as are fit for a good man and a gentleman to say and listen to; for there are things which are becoming for such a man to say and listen to in the way of jest, and there is a difference between the jesting of a gentleman, and that of a vulgar person; and again, between that of the educated and uneducated man. This you may see by a comparison of the old and the new

comedy; in the former, it was obscene talk which made the fun; in the latter, it is rather innuendo, and this is no slight difference as regards decency.

Well then, are we to define him who jests well as one who says what befits a gentleman, or who avoids giving pain, or actually gives pleasure, to the object of his wit? Will not such a definition be vague, since different things are hateful and pleasant to different men.

But the things that he will listen to will correspond to those that he will say, since it is commonly held that a man will make such jests as he can bear to listen to, and consequently, he will not indulge in every kind of jest. For ridicule is a species of abuse, and there are some kinds of abuse forbidden by law; it may be, certain kinds of jesting should have been also so forbidden. The refined and gentlemanly man, therefore, will bear himself thus, being, as it were, a law to himself. Such then, is the character of him who observes the mean, whether he be called a man of tact, or a man of wit.

But the buffoon cannot resist a joke, sparing neither himself nor others, if only he can but raise a laugh, saying things which no man of refinement would say, and some which he would not even listen to.

The boor is wholly useless for this kind of intercourse: he contributes nothing to it himself and is annoyed with all who do.

Yet some recreation and amusement in life are generally thought to be indispensable.

The mean states then in life which have been described are three, and they are all concerned with our intercourse in words and deeds: but they differ in that one of them is concerned with truth, while the other two are concerned with pleasure: and of the two which are concerned with pleasure, one is concerned with pleasure in our amusements, the other in all other kinds of social intercourse.

CHAPTER XI



O speak of shame as a virtue is incorrect, for it is more like a feeling or emotion, than a moral state. It is defined, we know, as a kind of fear of disgrace, and its effects are similar to those of the fear of danger, for men blush when they are ashamed, while they who fear death turn pale. So both are evidently in a way physical, which is thought to be a mark of a feeling or emotion, rather than of a moral state.

Moreover, it is a feeling which is not becoming to every period of life, but only to youth. We hold that the young ought to have a sense of shame, as, their life being directed by their emotions, they often do wrong, and shame acts on them as a check. And so we praise young men for being susceptible to shame, but no one would ever praise an old man for being given to it, as

we hold that he ought not to do things which occasion shame. For shame is not the part of a good man, since it is occasioned by low bad actions, for such actions ought not to be done at all: nor does it make any difference that some things are really disgraceful, others only because they are thought to be so, for neither ought to be done, and so a man ought not to be in the position of feeling shame. It is, of course, only a man of low character who is disposed to do anything disgraceful. And for a man to be such that he would feel shame if he should do anything disgraceful, and to think that this constitutes him a good man, is absurd; for shame is occasioned by voluntary actions only, and a good man will never voluntarily do what is base.

Consequently shame is only hypothetically good, that is to say, if a man should act in a particular way, he would be ashamed: but there is nothing hypothetical about the virtues. And granting, that it is base to be shameless or not to be ashamed at doing disgraceful deeds; it does not therefore follow,

that it is good to do them, and be ashamed of doing them.

Nor is continence properly a virtue, but a kind of mixed state, but this subject will be fully discussed later.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
ELEVENTH CHAPTER

BOOK V

CHAPTER I



WE now have to investigate justice and injustice and to consider with what kind of actions they are concerned, and in what sense justice is a mean state, and what are the extremes between which the just is a mean. And in this enquiry we will follow the same method as we observed before.

We see then that all men mean, by the term justice, the moral state which makes men able to do what is just, and which makes them act justly and wish what is just; similarly by injustice, they mean the moral state which makes men act unjustly, and wish what is unjust. Let us then adopt these definitions as an outline to work upon.

We mention the two, for moral or physical states differ in one respect to sciences and faculties. I mean, that whereas it seems that

the same faculty or science embraces contraries, a moral or physical state does not; thus health, for instance, does not produce results contrary to health, but healthy results only; for we say a man walks healthily when he walks as a healthy man would walk.

However, one of two contrary moral states may frequently be known from its opposite, and oftentimes moral states may be known by causes and results; if it be seen clearly what a good state of health is, then is it also seen what a bad state is, and a good state of health is known from the conditions which produce good health, and vice versa. If, for instance, a good state of health consists in firmness of flesh, it follows that a bad state of health will consist in flabbiness of flesh; and whatever produces firmness of flesh is conducive to good health.

It follows, moreover, as a general rule, that if one of two contrary terms is used in more senses than one, so also will the other be; as, for instance, if the term just has several senses, so also has the term unjust. Now it seems that both justice and injustice are used in

a variety of senses, but because the line of demarcation between these is very fine and minute, it commonly escapes notice that they are thus used, and it is not plain and manifest, as where the various significations of terms are widely different: for in these last the difference is really great, as, for instance, the same Greek word is used to denote the bone which lies under the neck of animals, and the instrument with which we lock a door.

Let us then ascertain in how many senses the term 'unjust man' is used. Well, he who violates the law is said to be unjust, as also is he who takes more than his share: and so manifestly the just man will be, the man who observes the law, and who is fair in his dealings. Accordingly, that which is just will be what is lawful and fair, and that which is unjust will be what is unlawful and unfair.

Now, since the unjust man, in one of the two senses of the word, is one who takes more than his share, he will have to do, of course, with good things, not with good things of every kind but only those which are concerned with good and bad fortune, and which are

always good in themselves, but not always good to the individual. Yet these are the things men pray for and pursue; but they ought to pray that such things as are in the abstract good may be good also for themselves, and choose such things as are good for themselves.

But the unjust man does not always choose what is more than his share, but sometimes he even chooses what is less, as in the case of things which are absolutely evil; but as the less of two evils is considered to be in a manner a good, and to take more than one's share means to take more than one's share of what is good, therefore, even in this case, he is said to take more than his share. But in either case he is an unfair man, unfairness being a wider and inclusive term.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FIRST CHAPTER

CHAPTER II



WE said that the law-breaker is unjust, and the law-abiding man just, it is clear that all lawful things are in a manner just, because by lawful we understand such things as have been prescribed by the legislative power, and all such we call just. The laws prescribe about all manner of subjects, aiming either at the common good of all, or of the best men, or of those in power, taking for the standard real goodness, or adopting some other such estimate; and so in one sense we apply the term just to whatever tends to produce and preserve the happiness of the social community, and whatever constitutes that happiness.

The law commands us to do the deeds of the brave man, as not to leave the ranks, or run away, or throw away our arms; and also those of the temperate man, as to abstain from adultery and outrage; and those of the gentle

man, as to refrain from assault and abuse ; and so with all the other virtues and vices, commanding some things and forbidding others, rightly if it is a good law, not so rightly if it is a hasty and ill-directed one.

Justice then is, in fact, complete virtue, yet not so in an absolute sense, but as exercised towards one's neighbours ; and for this reason justice is often regarded as the highest of the virtues, 'nor even-star, nor morning star so fair,' or as the proverb says, 'in justice all the virtues are comprehended.' It is in a special sense complete virtue, because it is the practice of complete virtue. And it is also complete, because he that has it is able to practise his virtue in dealing with his neighbour, and not merely by himself ; for there are many who can practise virtue in the regulation of their own personal conduct, but who are wholly unable to do it in transactions with their neighbour. And for this reason that saying of Bias is thought to be a good one, 'office will show what a man is ;' for he who bears office is necessarily brought into contact and association with

others. It is this same reason which makes justice alone of all the virtues seem to be the good of others, as it implies relation to others, for the just man does what is for the interest of another, whether of his ruler or of his fellow-citizen. Now the worst of men is he who practises vice not only in his own person, but towards his friends also; but the best of men is he who practises virtue not merely in his own person, but also towards his neighbour, for this is a difficult matter.

Justice, then, in this sense of the word, is not a part of virtue, but the whole of virtue; and its opposite, injustice, is not a part of vice, but the whole of vice. But wherein justice in this sense differs from virtue appears from what has been said; it is the same really, but the point of view is not the same: viewed in relation to others, it is justice, viewed simply as a moral state, it is virtue.

CHAPTER III



UT the object of our inquiry is justice, in the sense in which it is a part of virtue, for there is such a justice, as we assert, and likewise that injustice which is a part of vice.

And of the existence of this last, the following consideration is a proof: there are many vices, by practising which a man acts unjustly of course, but does not take more than his share of good; if, for instance, he throws away his shield through cowardice or uses abusive language through ill-temper, or refuses a friend pecuniary assistance through illiberality. But whenever he takes more than his share, it often happens that he displays no one of these vices, certainly not all of them, yet he displays a species of vice, for which we blame him, and this vice is injustice. There is then another kind of injustice which is a part of injustice as a whole, and another sense of the word unjust,

in which it is a part of the unjust in the wide meaning in which it is co-extensive with violation of the law.

Again, if one man commits adultery with a view to gain, and makes money by it, and another man does the same from lust, at an expense of money and loss; the latter would seem to be profligate rather than grasping, but the former to be unjust, and not profligate. The reason being that his object was gain.

Again, it is possible to refer all other acts of injustice to some particular vice, as if a man commits adultery, to profligacy; if he deserts his comrade, to cowardice; if he strikes another, to anger: but in a case of unjust gain, the act is referred to no other vice than injustice.

Thus it is clear that, besides injustice as a whole, there is another particular kind of injustice, having the same name, as its definition falls under the same genus; for both display their force in dealings with others, but the one is concerned with honour, or wealth, or safety, or whatever name we may

have for all these things, and its motive is the pleasure of gain, while the other is concerned with the whole sphere of the good man's action.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
THIRD CHAPTER

CHAPTER IV



IT is clear then that there are more kinds of justice than one, and that there is a kind which is different from complete virtue: we must next ascertain what it is, and what are its characteristics.

Well, the unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unfair, and the just accordingly into the lawful and the fair; the injustice already described corresponds to the unlawful. But as what is unfair and what is unlawful are not the same thing, but differ from it as the part from the whole, what is unfair being always unlawful, but what is unlawful not being always unfair, it follows that there is an unjust and an injustice which stand to those previously mentioned in the relation of parts to wholes; for this injustice is a part of complete injustice, and likewise this justice is a part of complete justice. So that what we

have now to speak of is particular justice and particular injustice, and likewise of that which is just and unjust in a particular sense.

We may dismiss, then, any further consideration of the justice which corresponds to complete virtue and of the injustice parallel with it, the one being the exercise of complete virtue, the latter of complete vice in relation to others. It is clear, too, how we are to determine that which is just and that which is unjust with reference to this kind of justice and of injustice. For we may say, that the majority of the actions prescribed by law are actions which result from complete virtue, for the law commands us to live in accordance with every virtue, and forbids us to live in accordance with any vice. And the causes which produce complete virtue are to be found in those enactments which have been made in regard to the education of a man as a citizen.

As to the education of the individual, which makes him a good man in the absolute sense, and not merely a good citizen, we must determine at a future time whether it be-

longs to the science of politics or some other science; for it is possibly not the same thing in every case to be a good man and a good citizen.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FOURTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER V



OF particular justice, and of the just action which corresponds to it, one kind is that which is concerned with the distribution of honour, or wealth, or such things as are shared among the members of the community, for in all these matters it is possible for one man's share to be equal or unequal as compared with another's, and the other kind is that which is corrective in the various transactions between man and man.

And this latter is again divided into two kinds: for of transactions, some are voluntary, and some involuntary; voluntary transactions are such as selling, buying, lending at interest, giving security, lending without interest, depositing money, hiring: and these are called voluntary, because the origin of these transactions is voluntary.

Involuntary transactions again are of two

kinds, one involving secrecy ; as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, kidnapping of slaves, assassination, false witness ; the other involving open violence ; as assault, imprisonment, murder, rape, maiming, slander, insult.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FIFTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VI



THE unjust man, we have said, is unfair, and that which is unjust is unfair: now, it is plain that there is a certain mean in respect of the unequal, and this mean is that which is fair or equal, for any action that admits of too much or too little, admits also of that which is fair. If then that which is unjust is unfair, that which is just is fair, as all must allow without further proof. But since that which is fair or the equal is a mean between two extremes, that which is just must be also a mean. But fairness or equality implies two terms at least: it follows then that that which is just is both a mean and fair or equal, and relative to certain persons; and that, in so far as it is a mean, it is a mean between certain extremes, that is, the greater and the less, and that in so far as it is equal, it involves two quantities, and that in so far as it is just, it is relative to certain persons. That which is

just then must imply four terms at least, for the persons relatively to whom it is just are two, and the terms representing the things are two.

And there must be the same equality between the persons, as between the things: as the things are to one another, so must the persons be. For if the persons are not equal, they will not have equal shares; in fact, this is the very source of all the quarrelling and wrangling in the world, when persons who are equal have unequal shares, or when persons who are not equal have equal shares awarded to them. Again, the necessity of this equality of ratios is shown by the common phrase 'according to merit,' for all men agree that justice in distributions must be according to merit of some kind: but what that standard ought to be, all do not agree, the democrats are for freedom, oligarchs for wealth, others for nobleness of birth, and the aristocratic party for virtue.

We see, then, that that which is just is a certain proportionable thing. For proportion does not apply merely to numbers in the abstract, but to all things that can be numbered, proportion being equality of ratios,

and implying four terms at least, that this is the case in what may be called discrete proportion is plain and obvious, but it is true also in continuous proportion, for in continuous proportion one of the terms is used as two, and is repeated; thus as A is to B, so is B to C. The term B, then, is repeated; and so, if B is set down twice, the terms of the proportion will be four. That which is just likewise requires four terms at least, and that the ratio between the two pair of terms be the same, the persons and the things being similarly divided. As, then, A is to B, so must C be to D, then alternando as A is to C, so must B be to D, and then, supposing C and D to represent the thing, as A plus C is to B plus D, so must A be to B. The distribution in fact consisting in putting together these terms thus: and if they are put together so as to preserve this same ratio, the distribution is just. So then the joining together of the first and third and second and fourth proportionals is that which is just in distribution, and that which is just is a mean between the violations of proportion, for that which is proportionate

is a mean, and that which is just is proportionate. Mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical; for in geometrical proportion, the whole is to the whole as each part is to each part. But this proportion is not continuous, for one term cannot stand both for person and thing.

That which is just then in this sense is that which is proportionate, and that which is unjust is that which is disproportionate; and this disproportion may be caused either by excess or defect: which, in fact, is the case in actual transactions, for he who acts unjustly has the greater share, and he who is treated unjustly has the less of what is good: but in the case of what is evil this is reversed, for the lesser evil in comparison with the greater is reckoned as a good, as the lesser evil is more desirable than the greater, and that which is desirable is a good, and that which is more desirable is a greater good.

This, then, is one form of that which is just.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
SIXTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER VII



THE remaining form of justice is the corrective, which occurs in private transactions whether voluntary or involuntary. This justice differs in kind from the former; for distributive justice in dealing with what is common property is always according to the proportion which we have described. For instance, if a common fund has to be divided, the payments made will bear the same ratio to one another, as the original contributions did; and the injustice which is opposite to this form of justice, is that which violates the proportion.

But that which is just in private transactions is fair or equal in a certain sense, and that which is unjust is unfair or unequal, not, however, in geometrical but in arithmetical proportion. For it makes no difference, whether a good man defrauds a bad man, or a bad man defrauds a good man, nor whether

it be a good or a bad man who commits adultery; the law looks only to the difference created by the injury, it treats the parties as equal, and asks only whether the one has done and the other suffered injury. And so that which is unjust is something unfair or unequal, which the judge endeavours to reduce to equality again, for even when one party is struck and the other strikes, or one kills and the other is killed, the suffering and the action are divided into unequal shares; and the judge tries to restore equality by the penalty which he inflicts, thereby taking from the gain of the offender.

For in all such cases, though the terms are not always strictly appropriate, we generally speak of the gain of the man who has given a blow, and the loss of him who has received it: but it is when the suffering has been assessed, that what the offender gets is called loss, and what the sufferer gets is called gain.

And so that which is fair or equal is a mean between that which is too much and that which is too little, and gain and loss are

respectively too much and too little in opposite ways, that is, gain is too much good and too little evil, and loss is too much evil and too little good. The mean between them is that which is equal, which we say is just, and so corrective justice must be the mean between loss and gain. This is the reason why, upon a dispute arising, men have recourse to a judge; and to go to a judge is, in fact, to go to what is just, for the judge is intended to be the personification of justice. And men look to a judge as one who observes the mean, as is expressed in the name mediators given by some to judges, signifying that if they can obtain the mean, they will obtain that which is just. That which is just then is surely a mean, as the judge is a mean.

It is the office of a judge to restore equality, and as if a line were divided into two unequal parts, and he were to cut off from the greater part that by which it exceeds the half, and to add this on to the less. And when the whole is divided into two exactly equal portions, then people are said to have their own, as having received an equal amount. This

equal amount is an arithmetical mean between the greater and the smaller.

This, by the way, is the reason why it is called just, because it signifies that the division is an equal one. For when a part is cut off from one of two equal magnitudes and added to the other, the second exceeds the first by twice that portion: if it had been merely cut off from the first and not added to the second, then the second would have exceeded the first only by that one portion; but in the other case, the second exceeds the mean by one such portion, and the mean also exceeds the first by one. By this means, then, we can know how much to take from him who has too much, and how much to add to him who has too little. We must add to him who has too little the amount by which the mean exceeds his share, and take from the greater share the amount by which it exceeds the mean.

Thus let there be three straight lines equal to one another. From one of them cut off a portion, and add as much to another of them. The whole line thus made will exceed the remainder of the first-named line, by twice

the portion added, and will exceed the untouched line by that portion. The terms loss and gain are derived from voluntary exchange; for in voluntary exchange, having more than what was one's own is called gaining, and having less than one had to start with is called losing; as is the case, for instance, in buying and selling, or in any other transactions which are guaranteed by law; but when the result is neither more nor less, but exactly the same amount as there was originally, people are said to have their own, and to be neither losers nor gainers.

So then in corrective justice that which is just is a mean, between the gain and the loss involved in involuntary transactions, and consists in having after the transaction the same as one had before it took place.

CHAPTER VIII



HERE are some people who hold that retaliation is simply just, as the Pythagoreans used to teach ; for they defined justice, simply and without qualification, as exact retaliation. But this simple retaliation will not suit either distributive or corrective justice, and yet this is the interpretation they put on the Rhadamanthine rule, ‘If a man should suffer what he hath done, then there would be straightforward justice ;’ for in many cases differences arise : as, for instance, suppose one in authority has struck a man, he is not to be struck in return ; or if a man has struck one in authority, he must not only be struck, but punished also. And further the voluntariness or involuntariness of an action makes a great difference.

But in dealings of exchange this kind of justice, namely, retaliation, forms the bond of

union; but then it must be proportionate retaliation and not equal retaliation, for by proportionate retaliation the social community is held together. For either a man desires to requite evil with like evil, and if this be not allowed, it seems to be slavery; or else he desires to requite good with like good, and if this be not effected, then there is no exchange of services, but it is by this exchange that the state is held together.

This is the reason why men set up a Temple of the Graces in the public streets, that they may remember to repay that which they receive, this being the peculiar characteristic of grace, for a man ought to requite with a good turn the man who has done him a favour, and then to take the initiative in doing a favour himself.

But proportionate requital is brought about by cross-conjunction.

Thus let A stand for a builder, B for a shoemaker, C for a house, D for shoes.

The builder then ought to receive from the shoemaker some portion of his work, and to give him his own work in return. If then

there be proportionate equality in the first instance, and then retaliation takes place, the result of which we are speaking will take place. But otherwise there will be no real equality and no intercourse will be possible; for there is no reason why the work of the one should not be better than that of the other, and therefore, before the exchange is made, they ought to be equalised. And this is the case also with the other arts; for they would have been destroyed entirely if there were not a correspondence in point of quantity and quality between the producer and the consumer. For, we must remember that no dealing arises between two of the same kind, two physicians, for instance; but say between a physician and a farmer, or to state it generally, between those who are different and not equal, but these of course must be equalised before the exchange can take place.

It is therefore indispensable that all things which can be exchanged should be capable of comparison, and for this purpose money was invented, and serves as a kind of medium, for it measures all things, and consequently

excess and defect; for instance, how many shoes are equal to a house or a given quantity of food. As a builder then is to a shoemaker, so must so many shoes be to a house, or to a given quantity of food, for unless there is this proportion, there cannot be exchange or dealing, and this proportion cannot be, unless the terms are in some way equalised; hence the need, as was said before, of some one measure of all things. And now this measure is, in fact, the demand for mutual services, which holds society together; for if people had no wants at all, or had no common wants, there would either be no exchange, or at least it would not be the same as it is now.

And money has come to be, by general agreement, a representative of this demand; and this is why it is called money, because its value is not intrinsic but conventional, and because it is in our power to change it and make it wholly useless.

Retaliation, then, will take place when the terms have been equalised, so as to stand in this proportion; as a farmer is to a shoemaker so must the wares of a shoemaker be to the

wares of a farmer; but you must bring them to this form of proportion when they exchange, otherwise one of the two extremes will have his superiority counted twice over: but when both parties are still in possession of their own wares, then they will be equal and can make an exchange, because the proper equality can be established between them. Thus let A represent a farmer, C food, B a shoemaker, D his wares equalised with A's. If this kind of reciprocity were not practicable, there would have been no dealings between them.

And that it is mutual need which forms a bond holding society together, is shown by the fact, that when men stand in no need of one another, or even when one of two men is in no need of the other, they do not effect an exchange at all: whereas they do when one wants what the other man has, wine for instance, giving in return corn for exportation.

Money, also, is a kind of security to us in respect of exchange at some future time, supposing that if we do not want a thing now, we shall be able to have it when we do; for, if

a man brings money, it must be in his power to get goods in exchange. Money is, of course, subject to the same laws as other things, its value is not always the same, but still it tends to be more constant than the value of anything else. And this is the reason why all things should have a price set upon them, because thus there may be exchange at any time, and, if exchange, then dealing. So money, like a measure, making all things commensurable, equalises them; for if there was not exchange, there would not have been dealing, nor exchange if there were no equality, nor equality if there were not the capacity of being commensurate. It is impossible that things so widely different should be really commensurate, but we can approximate sufficiently for all practical purposes in reference to demand. There must be some one common symbol for this, and that one upon which the world is agreed: so it is called money, for it is this which makes all things commensurable; in fact, all things are measured by money. Let B represent 10 minæ, A a house worth five minæ, or in other words half

B, C a bed worth one-tenth of B: it is clear then how many beds are equal to one house, namely, five.

It is obvious also that exchange was thus conducted before the existence of money; for it makes no difference whether you give five beds for a house, or the value of five beds.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
EIGHTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER IX



THUS then we have described that which is unjust and that which is just, and these having been defined, it is plain that just conduct is a mean between doing and suffering injustice ; the former being equivalent to taking more than one's share, and the latter to getting less than one's share.

But justice, it must be observed, is a mean state not in the same way as the virtues already described, but because it aims at producing the mean, while injustice aims at producing both the extremes.

And justice is a moral state in virtue of which the just man is said to be disposed to do deliberately that which is just, and to effect a distribution whether as between himself and another, or between two other people, not in such a manner as to give to himself the greater and to his neighbour the less share of what

is desirable, and conversely of what is hurtful, but so as to give what is proportionately equal, and similarly when adjudging the rights of two other people.

Injustice, on the contrary, aims at that which is unjust : but that which is unjust is the disproportionate excess or defect of what is good or hurtful respectively, therefore injustice is both excess and defect, because it aims at producing excess and defect ; in one's own case, that is to say, excess of what is simply advantageous, and defect of what is hurtful, while in the case of others they are, generally speaking, similar, but the violation of proportion may be either on one side or the other. But in an act of injustice the defect is to suffer wrong, and the excess is to commit a wrong unjustly towards others.

Let this, then, be accepted as a sufficient account of the nature of justice and injustice, and similarly of that which is just and unjust generally.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
NINTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER X



UT since it is possible for a man to do an unjust act without being unjust, the question arises what unjust acts are these, that, if a person commits them, he is proved to be unjust in some particular respect, say a thief, an adulterer, or a robber.

We may say, I think, that there is no such difference in the acts themselves; a man might, for instance, commit adultery, knowing well what he was about, and yet not be acting deliberately at all, but from a momentary passion. Such a man, then, acts unjustly, but is not necessarily unjust; that is, he is not a thief although he committed a theft, nor an adulterer although he committed an act of adultery, and so on in other cases which might be enumerated.

The relation which retaliation bears to justice has been already described. But it

ought not to escape our notice that the justice which we are investigating is at once absolute and political justice—justice, that is to say, as it exists among those who live in communion with a view to independence, and who are free and equal either proportionately or numerically.

It follows then, that where men do not stand in this relation to one another, there can be no political justice in their mutual dealings, but only a kind of justice which resembles it. For justice implies mutually acknowledged law, and the existence of law implies the possibility of injustice, for the administration of justice is the determination of what is just and what is unjust.

But injustice implies an act of injustice, although an act of injustice does not always imply injustice, for an act of injustice consists in giving one's self the larger share of what is abstractedly good, and the smaller share of what is abstractedly evil.

This, by the way, is the reason why we do not allow an individual to rule over us, but reason or law, because an individual is apt to

rule for his own good alone and to become a tyrant. But the magistrate is the guardian of justice, and therefore of equality also. Well then, it seems that he gains no personal advantage from his office if he is a just man, for in this case he does not allot to himself the larger share of what is abstractedly good, unless indeed it falls to his share proportionately. He really governs, therefore, for others, and so justice, men say, is a good not to one's self so much as to others, as we remarked before. Some compensation must, therefore, be given him in the shape of honour and privilege; and it is when they are not content with these rewards that magistrates become tyrants.

But justice between master and slave or between father and child is not the same as political justice, although it resembles it. For a man cannot commit injustice, in an absolute sense, towards those things which are his own; and his property, and his children, until they attain a certain age, and become independent, are, as it were, part of a man's self, and no man deliberately chooses to hurt himself;

hence there cannot be injustice towards one's own self. It follows that political justice and injustice are impossible in the relation of a man either to his children or his slaves, for they are dependent upon law, and so can only exist, as we said, between those among whom law naturally exists; that is to say, among those who share equally in ruling, and being ruled.

Hence also there is more scope for justice between a man and his wife, than between a man and his children or slaves, for this is domestic justice: although this too is different from political justice.

Political justice is of two kinds, natural and conventional; the former being that which has the same force everywhere, and does not depend upon our accepting or rejecting it; the latter being that which originally may be determined this way or that indifferently, but which when once determined is no longer indifferent: as, for instance, that the ransom of a prisoner of war should be a mina, or that a sacrifice should consist of a goat instead of two sheep; and again, all cases of special

enactment, as the sacrificing to Brasidas as a hero; in short, all matters of special decree.

But there are some men who think that all justice whatsoever is conventional, because that which exists by nature, they say, is unchangeable, and has the same force everywhere; fire, for instance, burns equally here and in Persia, while that which is just is seen to be variable.

But this is not altogether true, and yet it is true in a way. Among the gods, indeed, perhaps it is not true at all, but amongst men there is a kind of natural justice, although all human justice is subject to change, still there is a justice which is natural, as well as a justice which is not.

Nay, we may go further, and say that it is easy to see among things that may be other than they are, what kind of thing it is that is natural, and what kind that is not natural, but dependent upon law and convention, even granting that both are alike variable. The same distinctive illustration will apply to other cases; for instance, the right hand is natur-

ally stronger than the left, still, some men may become equally strong in both.

That justice which depends upon convention and expedience, may be compared to standard measures; for the measures of wine and corn are not equal in all places, but where men buy, they are large, and where these same sell again, they are smaller. And so in like manner is it with that justice which is not natural, but of human invention, for it is not everywhere the same, any more than the forms of government are, and yet there is by nature only one form of government which would be best in all places.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
TENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER XI



UT each rule of justice and of law bears to the acts which embody and exemplify it the relation of a universal to a particular; for the actions of men are many, while each rule is but one, for it is a universal. There is a difference between an act of injustice and that which is unjust, and between an act of justice and that which is just. A thing is unjust in itself, by nature or by ordinance; but the same thing when it is done is an act of injustice, though before it is done it is only unjust. And similarly of an act of justice. But as to the several kinds of acts of justice or injustice, how many there are, and with what things they are concerned, we must consider hereafter.

That which is just and that which is unjust, being then such as we have ascertained, a man is said to act unjustly or justly when he does

these things voluntarily, but when he does them involuntarily, then he neither acts unjustly nor justly, except in an accidental sense; that is, he does a thing which happens to be just or unjust.

So the justice or injustice of an act depends upon whether it is voluntary or involuntary; for when an act of injustice is voluntary, it is blamed, and then only is it properly an act of injustice. If it is involuntary, it will be unjust then in a sense, but will not amount to an act of injustice.

By a voluntary action I mean, as was stated before, an action which is in a man's own power, and is done by him with full knowledge, and not in ignorance of the person to whom he does it, or of the instrument with which he does it, or of the result; as, for instance, of the person whom he strikes, and the instrument he strikes him with, and the probable result of his blow; and not only so, he must not do it accidentally, nor by compulsion; as, for instance, if another man were to seize his hand and strike a third person with it, it would not be a voluntary action, as not being

in his own power: or again, it is conceivable that the person struck may be his father, and he may know that it is a man, or even one of the present company, whom he is striking, but not know that it is his father. And these same distinctions must be made with regard to the result, and in fact to the whole of any given action. That, then, which is done in ignorance, or though not done in ignorance is not in a person's control, or is done under compulsion, is involuntary; for there are many natural things which we do and suffer knowingly, but which are not either voluntary or involuntary, growing old, or dying, for instance.

Again, accidentality may belong equally to just and unjust acts. For instance, a man may have restored what was deposited with him against his will, and for fear of the consequences of a refusal; we must not then say that he either did what was just, or acted justly, except accidentally; and similarly, the man who under compulsion and against his will was prevented from restoring a deposit, must be said to have acted unjustly, or to

have done that which is unjust, accidentally only.

Voluntary actions we perform either with deliberate purpose or without it; with it, when we perform them after previous deliberation; without it, when without any previous deliberation. Now there are three ways in which harm may be done by one man to another in social intercourse. An action done in ignorance is generally called a mistake, when the action has affected some other person than the agent expected, or when the act itself has proved to be other than he expected, or when the instrument, or the result, has proved to be such; either he did not think to hit, or not to hit with this instrument, or not to hit this person, or that the blow would not have this effect, but the effect proved different to that which he anticipated, as, for instance, he did not intend to wound, but merely to prick; or he did not intend to wound this man but another, or not to inflict a wound of this kind.

Now when the hurt has come about contrary to all reasonable expectation, it is a

mishap; but when, although it is not contrary to expectation, yet without any vicious intention, it is a mistake; for a man makes a mistake when the origination of the cause rests with himself, he has a mishap when it is external to himself. When again he acts with knowledge, but without previous deliberation, it is an act of injustice; for instance, in all actions which arise from anger or other passions which are necessary or natural; for in doing such hurt and making such mistakes, they act unjustly of course, and their acts are acts of injustice, though they are not such as to stamp them unjust or wicked persons, for the hurt is not done out of wickedness. But when the action is done with deliberate purpose, then the doer is unjust and wicked.

And on this principle, acts done in anger are rightly judged not to be from malice pre-pense, for it is not the man who acts in anger, but he who evoked the anger, that begins the mischief. And again, the question at issue in such cases is not one of fact, but of justice, for anger arises at the appearance of injustice.

It is not as in questions of contract where two parties dispute about the fact, and one of the two must be a rogue, unless the dispute originate in forgetfulness, but in these cases they agree about the facts, and they dispute as to the side on which justice lies. It is different in the case of a deliberate aggressor; he knows very well the rights of the case. Hence the person who acts in anger thinks he is wronged, while the deliberate aggressor does not, so that the one thinks there is injustice committed, while the other does not.

Well then, a man acts unjustly if he has hurt another from deliberate purpose, and he who commits such acts of injustice, when they are in violation of the proportionate or the equal, is an unjust character. In like manner a man is a just character if he acts justly from deliberate purpose, and he does act justly if he merely acts voluntarily.

Then as for involuntary acts of harm, they are either such as are pardonable or such as are not: under the former head come all mistakes done not merely in ignorance, but from ignorance; under the latter all that are

done not from ignorance, but in ignorance caused by some passion which is neither natural nor fairly attributable to human infirmity.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
ELEVENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER XII



It may be doubted whether we have explained with sufficient clearness what it is to suffer and commit injustice.

First, whether the case is possible which Euripides has put, saying somewhat strangely,

‘ My mother he hath slain ; the tale is short,
Either he willingly did slay her willing,
Or else with her will but against his own.’

I mean then, is it really possible for a person to be wronged voluntarily, or is suffering injustice always involuntary, as doing injustice is always voluntary ?

Again, is the suffering of injustice always voluntary or always involuntary, as doing injustice is always voluntary, or is it sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary ?

Similarly with regard to being justly dealt with : for all just acting is voluntary, so that

it is fair to suppose that the voluntariness or involuntariness of being dealt with unjustly or justly must similarly correspond to the voluntariness or involuntariness of acting justly and unjustly.

But it would seem absurd to maintain that everybody who is justly dealt with is so dealt with voluntarily, for some people are certainly justly dealt with involuntarily. The fact is, a man may also fairly raise this question, whether in every case he who has suffered what is unjust is therefore unjustly dealt with, or rather whether the case is the same with suffering injustice as it is with doing injustice: namely, that in both it is possible to participate in what is just, but only accidentally. Clearly the case of what is unjust is similar: for doing that which is unjust is not identical with doing injustice, nor is suffering that which is unjust the same as being unjustly dealt with. And this is equally true of acting justly and being justly dealt with, for it is impossible to be unjustly dealt with unless some one else acts unjustly, or to be justly dealt with unless some one else acts justly.

But to do injustice means simply to hurt another voluntarily, and voluntarily means with knowledge of the person, the instrument, and the manner, then the incontinent man who voluntarily hurts himself will voluntarily suffer injustice, and it will be possible for a man to deal unjustly with himself. This by the way is one of the questions raised, whether it is possible for a man to deal unjustly with himself. Or again, a man may, through incontinence, voluntarily receive hurt from another man acting voluntarily, and so here will be another case of suffering injustice voluntarily.

The answer is that our definition of being unjustly dealt with is incorrect, and we must add to the words 'hurting with the knowledge of the person, the instrument and the manner,' the words 'against his wish.'

So then a man may be hurt and suffer what is in itself unjust voluntarily, but he cannot voluntarily have injustice done to him; for no man wishes to be hurt, even the incontinent man does not wish it, but acts contrary to his wish. For no man wishes for that

which he does not think to be good, and the incontinent man does not do what he thinks he ought to do.

But he that gives away his own property, as Homer says Glaucus gave to Diomed, 'armour of gold for brass, armour worth a hundred oxen for that which was worth but nine,' does not suffer injustice; for the giving rests entirely with himself, but suffering injustice does not rest with one's self, there must be some other person to do injustice.

It is clear then that the suffering of injustice is not voluntary.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
TWELFTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER XIII



HERE remain yet two points that we purposed to discuss : first, is it he who assigns to some one else more than he deserves, or he who receives it, that does injustice? next, can a man do injustice to himself?

If the first supposition is possible, and if it is the distributor who acts unjustly, and not he who has the larger share, then if a person knowingly and voluntarily gives more to another than to himself, he does injustice to himself. This is what moderate men are thought to do, for it is a characteristic of the equitable man to take less than his due.

But the case is not quite so simple ; it may be that he obtained a larger share of some other good, as of reputation, for instance, or of that which is good in the highest sense of the word. Again, the difficulty may be solved by reference to our definition of doing

injustice; for in this case, the man suffers nothing contrary to his own wish, so that, on this score at least, he is not unjustly dealt with, but if anything he is hurt only.

It is evident also that it is the distributor who acts unjustly, and not the man who has the greater share; for it does not follow, if a man possesses what is unjust, that he does injustice, but only if he voluntarily does it, and this is the case with the distributor and not with the receiver. And again, the term doing is used in several senses; in one sense, inanimate objects may be said to kill, or the hand, or a slave at his master's bidding; but though these may be said to do what is unjust, they cannot be said to act unjustly.

Again, suppose that a man has made a wrongful award in ignorance; in the eye of the law he does not act unjustly, nor is his award unjust, but yet it is in a certain sense; for there is a difference between that which is just according to law and that which is just according to nature: but if he knowingly decided unjustly, then he himself as well as the receiver got the larger share, that is,

either of favour from the receiver, or private revenge against the other party. The man, then, who decided unjustly from these motives gets a larger share, in exactly the same sense as a man would who received part of the actual matter of the unjust award; for in this case the man who wrongly adjudged, say a field, would receive not land, but money.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
THIRTEENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER XIV



MEAN suppose that it is in their power to act unjustly, and therefore conclude that it is therefore easy to be just. But this is not really so; to commit adultery with a neighbour's wife, or to strike one's neighbour, or to give away money, is of course easy, and in one's own power; but it is neither easy, nor in one's own power to do these things as the outcome of a certain character. Similarly, men think it needs no great wisdom to know what is just and what is unjust, because it is not hard to comprehend those things of which the laws speak. They forget that these actions are not just actions except accidentally, to be just, they must be done and distributed in a certain manner; and this is a more difficult task than to know what things are wholesome; for in this branch of knowledge, it is an easy matter to understand the nature of honey,

and wine, and hellebore, and cautery, and the knife, but to know how one should administer these with a view to health, and to whom and at what time, amounts in fact to being a physician.

For this very same reason they suppose also, that the just man is as able to act unjustly as justly, for the just man is not less, but even more capable than anybody else of performing particular acts: as for instance, committing adultery, striking a blow; as the brave man is even more capable than another of throwing away his shield, and turning his back, and running this way or that. True, but then it is not the mere doing these things which constitutes acts of cowardice or injustice, except accidentally, but the doing them in a certain definite frame of mind: just as it is not the mere using or not using the knife, administering or not administering certain drugs, which constitutes medical treatment or curing, but doing these things in a certain particular way.

Lastly, the rules of justice have their province among those who participate in such

things as are absolutely good, but who can have too much or too little of them; for there are some beings who cannot have too much of them, as perhaps the gods; there are others, again, to whom no particle of them is of use, those who are incurably wicked, to whom all things are hurtful: others to whom they are useful to a certain degree: for this reason, then, justice is essentially human.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FOURTEENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER XV



WE have next to speak of equity and the equitable, that is to say, of the relations of equity to justice, and of that which is equitable to that which is just. For when we look into the matter, the two do not appear to be absolutely identical, nor yet to be generically different. Sometimes we praise that which is equitable, and the equitable man, and actually use the word metaphorically as a term of praise to other objects, instead of the term good, thus showing that the more equitable a thing is, the better it is. At other times, following a certain train of reasoning, we arrive at a difficulty when we say that the equitable is praiseworthy if it be different from what is just; for it seems to follow, either that the just is not good, or the equitable is not good, since they are by hypothesis different; or if both are good, then they are identical.

These are the considerations which give rise to the difficulty about what is equitable. But, in fact, they are all in a way correct, and involve no real contradiction; for that which is equitable, though it is better than that which is just in one sense of the word, is yet itself just, and is not better than what is just in the sense of being something generically distinct from it. The just and the equitable then are identical, and though both are good, the equitable is better.

The difficulty arises from the fact that the equitable, indeed, is just, but not as being legal justice, but a rectification of legal justice. The reason why the law requires rectification is, that all law is necessarily universal, whereas there are some subjects on which it is impossible to speak correctly in general terms. Where then there is a necessity for a general statement, while a general statement cannot apply rightly to all cases, the law takes the generality of cases, being fully aware of the error thus involved; and rightly too notwithstanding, because the fault is not in the law, or in the framer of the law, but is inherent

in the nature of the case, for the subject-matter of human action is necessarily of this description.

When then the law has spoken in general terms, and there arises a case of exception to the general rule, it is right, in so far as the legislator omits the case, or by reason of his universality of statement is wrong, to set right the omission by ruling it as the legislator himself would rule, were he there present, and would have provided in the law itself had he foreseen the case would arise. And so that which is equitable then is just, and better than one form of justice; not, indeed, better than absolute justice but better than the error of justice which arises out of the universality of statement. This is the nature of the equitable, a rectification of law, where law is defective by reason of its universality.

This is the reason why things are not all determined by law, because there are things about which it is simply impossible to lay down a law, and so we require special decrees for particular cases. For to measure the indefinite, you require an indefinite rule,

like the leaden rule used in Lesbian architecture; for as this rule is not rigid but adapts itself to the form of each stone, so does the special decree to the circumstances of the case in question.

It is clear then what the equitable is, namely, that it is just, but better than one form of justice; and hence it appears too what is the nature of the equitable man: he is one who has a tendency to choose and carry out these principles, and who is not apt to press the letter of the law on the worse side, but content to waive his strict claims, though backed by the law: and his moral state is equity, which is a kind of justice, and not a different moral state from justice.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
FIFTEENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER XVI



THE answer to the question, whether it is possible for a man to act unjustly to himself, is obvious from what has been already said.

In the first place, one class of just acts consists of those actions which are enjoined by the law as being co-extensive with virtue as a whole. Thus the law does not command a man to kill himself; and whatever it does not command, it forbids: and further, when a man, contrary to the law, voluntarily hurts another not by way of retaliation, he acts unjustly, voluntarily meaning with knowledge of the person and the instrument. Now the man who kills himself in a rage, does so voluntarily in violation of right reason, and this the law does not allow. He therefore acts unjustly: but unjustly to whom? To the state, not to himself; for he suffers voluntarily, but no man can be treated with injustice

voluntarily. And on this principle the state punishes him; that is, a certain infamy is attached to the suicide, as one who acts unjustly towards the state.

And, in the second place, it is impossible for a man to act unjustly to himself in the sense in which he is said to be unjust, if he merely commits injustice and is not entirely bad. These two cases are different, for the unjust man is bad in the same way as the coward is bad, that is to say, not absolutely and entirely, but only in a particular and limited sense. But even in this sense, he does not act unjustly to himself; for if he did, then it would be possible for the same thing to be taken away from and added to the same person: but this is impossible, justice and injustice always implying more persons than one.

Again, an act of injustice must be voluntary, done with deliberate purpose, and aggressive. For the man who retaliates because he has first suffered, and retaliates in the same way, is not thought to act unjustly. But the man who hurts himself, suffers the same hurt at the same time that he inflicts it.

Again, if a man could act unjustly to himself, it would be possible for him to suffer injustice voluntarily.

And besides a man cannot act unjustly, without doing some particular act of injustice, but no one commits adultery with his own wife, or commits a burglary on his own premises, or steals his own property.

But the whole question whether a man can act unjustly to himself is settled by the answer we gave to the question whether a man could voluntarily be unjustly dealt with.

THIS IS THE END OF THE
SIXTEENTH CHAPTER

CHAPTER XVII



IT is clear, moreover, that to suffer and to do injustice, are both bad ; for the one is having less, the other having more, than the mean, and the case is parallel to what is healthy in medicine, or to what is productive of good condition in gymnastics : but still to do injustice to others is the worse of the two, because this is blameworthy and implies vice, either complete and absolute vice, or nearly so (for it is not every voluntary act of injustice which implies injustice), but the suffering of injustice does not imply vice or injustice.

In itself then, to be unjustly dealt by is less bad, but it may accidentally be the greater evil of the two. Science, however, does not concern itself with such considerations ; a pleurisy, for instance, is called a greater physical evil than a stumble ; and yet this last may be accidentally the greater evil ; it may chance that a stumble

may cause one to fall and to be captured by the enemy, and put to death.

But, speaking metaphorically, we may say that there is a kind of justice subsisting not between a man and himself exactly, but between certain parts of his nature; but it will not be every kind of justice that can thus subsist, but only such justice as occurs in the relation of master and slave, or in that of a father and his family. For all through this treatise the rational part of the soul has been viewed as distinct from the irrational.

And it is this distinction of parts that people have in view when they hold that there is such a thing as injustice towards one's self, because these parts are liable to suffer something contrary to their own desires, and hence there is some kind of justice between these two parts of the soul, analogous to that between ruler and ruled.

Let this then be accepted as a sufficient examination of justice and the other moral virtues.

